Peace could – A U.S.-Iran memorandum announced June 14 sparked Wall Street optimism the next day, but Iran’s leadership may face a different kind of danger if the conflict ends—because the repression and economic pain tied to war excuses still have to be managed without war
When the U.S. and Iran move from confrontation toward a peace framework, the timing looks almost tidy on Wall Street. The memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran was announced on June 14, and the next day the stock market surged on hopes of a return to normal.
In Washington, the mood was upbeat enough for President Trump—while leaving Versailles—to yell to reporters, “it’s signed.”
But inside Iran, “normal” has been out of reach for years, and the hope attached to the end of conflict may not translate into relief for the regime—or for the public it governs.
For nearly four months, Iran’s authorities have maintained a nationwide lockdown. Internet access has been restricted, financial markets have been distorted, and public executions of opponents have escalated. The explanation for those conditions has been the ongoing conflict with America and Israel. If that conflict fades, Iran’s rulers could find themselves confronting the grievances that preceded it.
The regime is not returning to a calm baseline before the fighting began on Feb. 28. Before the war started. Iran was already reeling from the Iranian people’s December uprising—described in the source as the most serious challenge to theocracy rule in years. That uprising stretched into January and was met with an almost complete internet blackout and a sweeping crackdown on dissent.
During that earlier unrest, the source says the regime reportedly killed more Iranians than the United States and Israel did during the subsequent conflict. And the uprising—before war—was driven by economic collapse and political repression.
The sequence matters: repression and economic collapse helped ignite the unrest, and war later gave the regime a different narrative for hardship—an all-purpose explanation that can work precisely because it is external.
When war is an excuse
A collapsing currency. shortages of consumer goods. and high unemployment are among the pressures the source ties to the regime’s explanation for suffering. Without war, that justification weakens. Internet access cannot remain suspended indefinitely, a currency cannot remain worthless forever, and store shelves cannot stay empty forever.
The agreement itself could create real breathing room. The source points to reported provisions including hundreds of billions of dollars in relief, the easing of sanctions, and the unfreezing of assets.
Still, breathing room is not the same thing as stability for the average person. Whether the agreement holds—and whether resources actually reach ordinary Iranians—remains an open question in the source’s framing. Even if relief is delivered at scale, expectations inside Iran may have changed. The December uprising showed what happens when people decide the regime can’t deliver prosperity, stability, and freedom.
What the regime learned from its own crisis
The source argues that it’s easy to assume repression is permanent, but the December uprising demonstrated the opposite in one sense: it showed that the regime’s grip is not absolute. In its view, the war provided a justification for repression that helped spark that uprising in the first place.
Without war, people’s expectations return—and the challenge for Iran’s rulers becomes whether they can meet them. The source says the regime could not do so before the conflict began and adds that there is little reason to believe it can now without significant change.
The conflict, the source also says, further eroded the regime’s legitimacy. It revealed that the theocracy is not all-powerful. It notes that the religious claims—already weakened in the eyes of many Iranians—have given way to a government that increasingly relies on repression to maintain control.
Survival is not strength
As the conflict’s immediate aftermath arrives, the instinct may be to focus on survival: that the theocracy remained in place. But the source insists survival should not be mistaken for strength.
It says the regime emerged from the conflict weakened, and that it was already struggling before the conflict began. Survival is framed as a short-term achievement, while thriving is what people are said to seek over the long term.
The regime remains in power. Yet the source’s central tension is that remaining in power does not answer the questions that fueled the December uprising.
It also points to a broader set of constraints: Iran is more isolated than ever, and the demonstrated need to reduce the world’s dependence on the Strait of Hormuz—over time—could leave Iran even more economically and regionally isolated.
Peace, in other words, may remove the regime’s most convenient explanation for hardship. That doesn’t automatically mean the regime collapses. But the logic of the source is stark: if the war excuse disappears. the pressures it obscured can return—with no guarantee the leadership can manage them without resorting again to the repression the public already rejected.
J.T. Young is the author of “Unprecedented Assault: How Big Government Unleashed America’s Socialist Left” from RealClear Publishing and follows on Substack.
Iran peace memorandum U.S. Iran sanctions Wall Street surge June 15 Strait of Hormuz Iranian uprising December internet shutdown Iran financial markets distorted Iran Teheran theocracy repression