When motherhood becomes a campaign weapon in Belarus

motherhood becomes – Belarus has long wrapped state power in family policy—paid maternity leave, childbirth benefits, housing loans, “family capital,” and the “Order of Mother.” But the same politics has also functioned as control: women and mothers have been courted as loyal citi

On election nights, Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s promise has never been only about power. Since his first presidential campaign in 1994, it has been about the future of the nation’s “little children”—and the kind of family that future is supposed to produce.

Lukashenka came to power in 1994 on an anti-corruption ticket. Yet his first campaign, too, was saturated with family and social policy. His electoral programme. published in the newspaper Narodnaya Volia (The People’s Will) on 14 June 1994. promised extensive state support for families. motherhood and childhood. It included childcare allowances, as well as housing loans and subsidies for young families.

During the campaign, even his anti-corruption rhetoric carried a moral and paternal framing. He appealed to voters by presenting the fight against corruption as protecting the nation’s future. declaring that corruption must be eradicated “for the sake of our little children.” At the same time. anti-corruption was used as a pretext to attack political opponents—an approach that resulted in effectively removing from power the then chairman of the Supreme Soviet. democrat Stanislaŭ Shushkevich.

That blend—carefully staged family language paired with a readiness to crush opponents—did not disappear as the years passed. Scholars describe Lukashenka’s style as pre-emptive and adaptive authoritarianism, emphasizing its volatility and capacity for adjustment. But under the shifting tactics, one element has stayed strikingly consistent: sustained attention to family and social policy.

The demographic numbers help explain why. Women are the majority of the population—52.9 per cent in 1994 and 53.8 per cent in 2025. Life expectancy widened the political usefulness of that fact. In 1994, women in Belarus lived on average to age 74, compared with 63 for men. By 2025, the figures had risen to roughly 79 and 69 respectively. The gap remains substantial and shows little sign of narrowing.

Still, demographics do not excuse what follows. Belarusian society is marked by persistent gender inequality and, as sociologist Elena Gapova noted in 2023, limited recognition of women’s autonomy. United Nations Development Programme data for Belarus shows the gender pay gap is around 27 per cent.

And within that tension sits the regime’s sexism—sometimes open, sometimes performative. Lukashenka’s notorious remark that “our constitution is not written for a woman [president]” has long been a hallmark of the regime and has intensified in recent years. His personal relationships with women have also drawn periodic public attention and speculation. His first wife. the mother of his two sons. never moved to the capital after his election and did not take on the public role usually associated with the country’s first lady. The mother of his third child, meanwhile, has never been officially presented as such.

Women appear frequently in public alongside Lukashenka—often young and conventionally attractive. The state. and as widely believed Lukashenka himself. controls and coordinates beauty contests such as Miss Belarus (launched in 1998) and The Beauty of Belarus (launched in 2020). alongside similar competitions at local and national levels. These are large, choreographed spectacles that instrumentalize women and their bodies. At the same time, the regime has repeatedly blocked the adoption of a law on domestic violence. Women, who constitute the overwhelming majority of victims, remain without effective protection from the state.

What makes the contradiction harder to ignore is how quickly benefits for some families can sit beside disadvantages for others.

Belarus’s family policy does include support that is concrete. It has roots in late-Soviet social policy and combines material assistance and symbolic measures. Two key dates mark the institutionalization of the policy framework: the adoption of the Basic Guidelines of State Family Policy in 1998 and the passage of the Law on Demographic Security in 2002. Today, key elements include three years of paid maternity leave and childbirth benefits.

The system also provides disproportionate support for large families, with many benefits reserved exclusively for them. Housing subsidies for young families with three or more children are one example—about 123,000 such families in Belarus in 2025. Concessional housing loans are another. There is also “family capital,” a one-time payment of roughly 10,000 US dollars that can be accessed once a child turns 18.

Large families receive free school lunches and exemptions from fees for textbooks and extracurricular activities. Alongside that material package, symbolic measures were introduced too. The “Order of Mother. ” a state award for women who have given birth to and raised five or more children. was established in 1995; since then around 14. 500 women have received it. The practice echoes the Soviet title of “Hero Mother. ” introduced under Stalin in 1944 for women who bore ten or more children.

These benefits have been implemented consistently. and many families—particularly low-income households—have received substantial state support that has helped improve their standard of living. Yet the main problem is the same one that can be felt across Lukashenka’s governing style: the system remains highly arbitrary and dependent on the president’s personal priorities and whims.

By placing certain families in a privileged position while disadvantaging others. the state intervenes in private lives and cultivates mechanisms of dependency. Instead of creating conditions where families can provide for themselves. the system encourages reliance on paternalistic state support in exchange for loyalty and public approval.

The demographic picture gives the welfare policy a reality check. According to official data, Belarus’s population declined from 10.3 million in 1994 to around 9.2 million in 2025. The country also records one of the lowest life expectancy rates in Europe. Taken together. these figures point to a policy that prioritizes “new” generations and large families while gradually marginalizing singles. child-free couples. small families. the elderly and those who do not conform to the state’s preferred social model.

The litmus test arrived in 2020.

After the presidential election that year, peaceful mass protests followed. They dealt a serious blow to Lukashenka’s authoritarian system. The protests showed the erosion of fear and the absence of genuine popular adoration. Most importantly, they revealed a collective “no” from women.

The movement was widely described as a “revolution with a female face.” Women assumed visible leadership roles and participated in massive numbers. They protested openly against violence. patriarchy. sexism and inequality in Belarusian society. mobilizing in defence of their own future and that of their children and grandchildren.

Then came retaliation.

Lukashenka responded with a systematic and calculated campaign of retribution against women that continues to this day. Over the past five years. the human rights centre Viasna has reported that around 8. 000 women have faced political persecution—based on documented cases alone. The proportion of women among political prisoners has exceeded post-Stalin Soviet levels: in recent years it has fluctuated between roughly 13 and 15 per cent of all political prisoners. while in the Soviet Union the figure was closer to five per cent.

Women prisoners have been subjected to forced labour and severe disciplinary measures. including confinement in punishment cells (kartser). while their specific needs and vulnerabilities have largely been ignored. Many have been separated from their children. Dozens of women with three or more children have been prosecuted and imprisoned for organizing local cultural events or posting a handful of critical messages on social media. Tens of thousands of women and children have also been forced into exile.

In emigration. integration brings its own injuries: severe obstacles to integration. confinement to low-skilled employment. poverty. physical and psychological strain. limited access to medical care. exhaustion and legal insecurity. Many are also unable to renew their Belarusian passports, which effectively deprives them of freedom of movement.

Women—especially mothers with young children and former political prisoners—are among the most vulnerable groups. Even after leaving the country, the Belarusian state continues to subject them to unprecedented pressure and intimidation.

Under that weight, Belarus has now decided to celebrate motherhood.

The regime declared 2026 the “Year of the Belarusian Woman.” Under that banner. it has launched a large-scale media campaign promoting large families and celebrating their mothers. The instrumentalization of family policy is nothing new for the Lukashenka regime. fitting into a broader global populist appeal to “traditional values” and anti-gender campaigns. In Belarus, this appeal takes a distinctive form: growing obsession with stimulating birth rates and actively promoting large families.

The campaigns rarely contain direct calls for women to submit to their husbands or withdraw from public life. No one openly demands that Belarusian women attend church, remain at home, or abandon their careers. Instead, one official slogan of the campaign this year proclaims: “A woman can do everything.”.

At first glance, it sounds like an uncomplicated affirmation. But the slogan lands on a history where Soviet state-imposed “gender equality” meant women were expected to work full time while bearing and raising children—often without meaningful sexual education or genuine reproductive autonomy. The current campaign goes further.

One story captured attention during research: Elena Viktorovna. a forty-five-year-old mother of eight. featured in a piece published on 22 February 2026 on the website of the major state newspaper Belarus Segodnya. Viktorovna was presented as exemplary. She cares for her children and also nursed her dying mother-in-law while pregnant with her youngest child. Still on maternity leave. she “happily” works in a ten-acre vegetable garden “because she loves the land.” When the children fall asleep. she knits and sews—making tablecloths. blankets. towels. sweaters and dresses for her daughters—and the journalist concludes she carries all this “lightly. with a smile.”.

Dozens of similar stories have been published by state-controlled media, including traditional outlets and new social media platforms. They consistently portray happy, often employed, mothers with many children who cope effortlessly with all responsibilities.

But the point of such stories is not only what they show—it is what they require.

Belarusian women, especially those on the margins of state power, are being exploited. Their bodies, work, and emotional resources are instrumentalized. They are expected to be productive workers and self-sacrificing mothers simultaneously, while their agency is taken away from them. Families are encouraged to bear more children in the name of elusive family happiness—and in exchange for paternalistic state care.

The campaign’s primary target audience is the lower middle-class and working-class families. Mothers in large households. especially those with limited resources. are constantly preoccupied with basic survival: how to feed. clothe and educate their children. They are forced to take on additional unpaid work. They grow vegetables and sew and knit to make ends meet.

There is also a social cost that rarely appears in these bright narratives. Children from such families, on average, have fewer chances in life. They are less likely to enter higher education and often join the labour market earlier. a pattern that corresponds with the state’s economic interests. Many young men will be conscripted into military service, with risks that follow.

The most unsettling consequence is political.

By overloading women—especially mothers—with endless responsibilities, the regime deprives them of time, energy and resources for political participation. Exhausted by everyday burdens, women become less able to mobilize, organize, and resist. Social and demographic policy turns into a tool of political control. The message is clear even when it is wrapped in smiling slogans: a moment like 2020 must not happen again.

A woman can do everything. In Belarus, the state’s campaign insists it means resilience. What it often produces. in practice. is a different kind of trap—one where the future is requested in exchange for obedience. and where motherhood is celebrated right up until the day women decide they will not be quiet.

Belarus Lukashenka motherhood family policy women’s rights demographics propaganda 2026 Year of the Belarusian Woman Miss Belarus domestic violence law Viasna political prisoners