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Ukraine urges mobile, buried drone command centers for NATO

mobile and – Ukraine’s Territorial Defense Forces say Russia’s hunt for drone locations forces constant relocation, pushing a lesson for NATO: treat drone command centers and training hubs as high-value targets by hiding them—often underground—and moving them whenever expo

RIGA, Latvia — In the drone war, the battlefield isn’t just where the drones fly. It’s where the command teams sit, train, and coordinate the next strike.

Taras Berezovets. head of the military cooperation department of Ukraine’s Territorial Defense Forces. laid out a hard-earned rule at a drone summit in Latvia: Western allies investing in drone warfare need to make their drone units and command centers mobile—and. whenever possible. buried deep underground.

“The West would do well to make sure that its future drone units and command centers are mobile and ideally underground because they are such high-value targets,” Berezovets said.

He described the cat-and-mouse reality Ukrainian forces live with every day. “This war, especially in terms of the drone war, is like a cat-and-mouse game. The Russians are always searching for the locations of our drone units,” he said. “So Ukraine is always relocating them, especially if there is a chance they have been exposed.”.

That logic extends to where command hubs should be built. Berezovets told the summit that Western allies should consider placing drone command centers “deeper underground.” “This is much more expensive. but with Russians and our Ukrainian experience. you can believe that it’s always better to hide these command centers and training centers deeper underground. ” he said. “They should be as deep as possible.”.

The lesson, he warned, becomes harder to apply in smaller NATO countries. Ukraine is nearly 10 times the size of Latvia. In countries with less room, he said, relocating drone units and command centers is far more difficult. “it would be much harder for you to find these locations.”

NATO’s structure adds another layer of friction. Berezovets pointed out that as an alliance, NATO gains more depth by dispersing units across its members. But in wartime. moving command centers. training sites. and combat drone units across borders would bring complications ranging from logistics and communications to permissions and coordination.

Ukraine has tried to turn that problem into a routine. Many of Ukraine’s drone command centers are concealed and operate underground when they can. Some centers have been built as mobile vehicle-based systems, with the command apparatus established inside trucks and armored vehicles. Drone operators, too, regularly work from concealed or underground positions, flying their drones as remotely as possible to stay safe.

Drone command centers are high-value targets because they coordinate high-impact weapons. Ukraine says drones are causing 90% of Russia’s front-line losses. Ukraine has also publicly celebrated when it has hit Russian drone command centers.

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And it isn’t only the command posts. Ukrainian officials and soldiers have described drone pilots themselves as priority targets. Berezovets called them “the primary targets for Russian units. ” saying “they are trying to kill them.” He said the threat also reaches the chain of command: last year. the head of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces said Russia tried to strike multiple Ukrainian drone unit leaders at once.

The warnings fit a broader shift in how Western militaries may need to prepare for future fights: greater mobility. discretion. and dispersal. Sir John Stringer. NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe. said Ukraine shows that what Western forces became used to after the Cold War—“the big single air operation center. which a lot of people have grown up with over the last sort of 35 years”—is no longer viable.

Dispersal, though, does not come without trade-offs. Stringer acknowledged that the more spread out the force becomes, the harder it is to manage. “The more distributed it becomes, the more difficult and challenging it is,” he said.

Ukrainian industry is drawing the same line of thinking beyond the battlefield. Some Ukrainian defense companies have told Western counterparts to stop producing everything in a single large site. and instead break efforts across multiple locations. They argue it makes production harder and more complicated, but safer—because it reduces the value of any single target.

Achi. the CEO of Ukrainian defense firm Ark Robotics. said the company makes sure different parts of manufacturing are “independently from the other” and stays flexible about location. “We try to avoid building a gigafactory. I would love that, to be honest, I think this is literally the best way to do it. You build a huge factory. everything is in there. ” he said. adding that he spoke using a pseudonym as a security precaution. Even as Ark Robotics explores manufacturing in other parts of Europe, Achi said the principle should hold. “as default for defense-based manufacturing going forward. you don’t want to have huge factories in one place because they are these targets. ” He called it “a much deeper long-term lesson” rather than something only companies in Ukraine need to learn.

Karmo Saar. head of sales for Estonian company Krattworks. which makes drones used by Ukraine. said some of Ukraine’s big drone makers have more than 15 production sites. even if it would be easier and cheaper to run everything in one big facility. Saar warned Europe to absorb the lesson before it is forced on them by events: “I think we’re going to be punished.”.

Ukraine NATO drones command centers military cooperation Territorial Defense Forces drone warfare Russia targets underground bases unmanned systems Ark Robotics Krattworks defense manufacturing

4 Comments

  1. Wait, I read this like they’re saying NATO should put the drones themselves underground?? Like how does that even work. Also Russia always “searching” sounds like propaganda, but I dunno.

  2. They’re saying make NATO drone bases mobile… but smaller countries can’t move stuff around like Ukraine can. So is Latvia just screwed then? Or are they gonna pretend it’s easy.

  3. Underground command centers is one of those things where it sounds obvious after the fact. But “as deep as possible” feels like it’ll never happen everywhere because money and engineering. Plus if they’re buried then how do they even communicate without getting cooked by EM stuff? Idk, just seems like another layer of risk.

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