A top NATO commander says the era of large, centralized air command centers is ending. As threats in the air multiply and bases face missile and drone attacks, he argues NATO needs command-and-control that is mobile, redundant, and survivable—an investment-hea
For decades, NATO’s air power has been run from big, fixed nerve centers—large command-and-reporting hubs where aircraft sorties, missile strikes, surveillance, and air defense could be coordinated in one place. But the “luxury” of that model can’t last.
Air Chief Marshal Sir John Stringer. NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe. said the West’s centralized approach is aging fast. He described how much of it still “looks like it did towards the last decade. two decades even with the Cold War. ” and argued that the growing number of air threats makes the old setup untenable.
The challenge isn’t just technological. It’s practical: if NATO wants to keep commanding aircraft under pressure, it will have to change how command works. “The sense of the big single air operation center… through to the fixed command and reporting centers… that’s going to have to change. ” Stringer said.
He didn’t frame it as a preference. He framed it as survival—arguing for “mobility, redundancy, and survivability in command and control,” and stressing: “Those are not going to become essential. They’re essential now.”
For NATO, the shift is also a catch-up job—something the alliance needs to “play catch-up” on. And it comes with a blunt trade-off: “Getting everybody in one place is easy,” Stringer said. “The more distributed it becomes, the more difficult and challenging it is.”
NATO is not starting from zero. Its current large air operation centers include the Combined Air Operations Center at Uedem, Germany. That center directs and monitors NATO missions with aircraft such as Dassault Rafales and F-16 fighter jets. and it is responsible for all of the alliance’s air policing in northern Europe. including in the Baltic region where the threat from Russia is strongest. Another center in northern Norway oversees missions across the Baltic Sea and the Nordic region.
Over recent decades. Stringer said the Western way of running air wars relied on a small number of large command-and-control organizations like these. The system worked extremely well when adversaries lacked the range to target those centers. But he warned that future wars are unlikely to follow that script.
He pointed to China and Russia as examples: both have built huge missile arsenals and lead producers of attack drones, while less advanced adversaries like Iran also complicate the picture. With that kind of threat environment, the old model becomes a liability, and NATO’s work will get harder.
The core requirement, Stringer said, is investment in modern communication and information systems to coordinate operations. “You’re going to have to do that.”
That means command functions spreading beyond a single headquarters. Stringer said communication will need to work in a more networked way, with command-and-control functions spread across multiple sites. A future mission set, he said, may distribute headquarters tasks from mission planning to tactical control across widely separated bases. The picture he described isn’t a single command bunker directing everything—it could involve different headquarters and ships. and aircraft. rather than a concentration in one headquarters or operations center.
He said NATO has already been testing elements of this approach. When Stringer served as deputy commander of NATO’s Allied Air Command. he said he started practicing how to distribute command functions to get “away from one single center.” Stringer added that NATO tests the idea in major exercises. calling it “very much a focus” across many parts of the alliance’s command.
His warning lands as NATO commanders and planners absorb lessons from the war in Ukraine. From the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, dispersal and mobility have been central to Ukraine’s survival. Ukraine kept its far smaller air force from being wiped out because it “very seldom will take off and land at the same airfield. ” a point a US general made when reflecting on what happened in the first 18 months. Russia. by contrast. took longer to disperse aircraft. and Ukraine was able to destroy many that were clustered on airfields and at air bases.
Ukraine’s adaptation extends to how it uses aircraft as well. It has also found ways to keep its US-made F-16s on the move, reducing reliance on advanced airfields that Russia considers priority targets. Ukraine has kept air defense assets, command centers, and key units on the move and concealed.
The same pressure is felt across broader defense operations. Ukrainian defense manufacturers have spread production across multiple sites to avoid creating a single target for Russia. even though Stringer’s argument that distribution makes everything more difficult fits here too—processes become harder when production is dispersed.
The stakes aren’t limited to Ukraine’s geography. Stringer’s remarks echo a wider strategic concern: large air bases like RAF Lakenheath in the UK and Ramstein in Germany could become targets for missile and drone barrages. In that scenario, runway damage could prevent aircraft from taking off and leave them exposed—“sitting ducks on the tarmac.”.
Stringer’s message also aligns with how US commanders describe the future environment. Gen. Kevin Schneider. the commander of US Pacific Air Forces. said last year that “the days of operating from secure. fixed bases are over.” He argued that threats in the Indo-Pacific required “a flexible. resilient force that can operate from multiple. dispersed locations under contested conditions.”.
Getting dispersed isn’t free. Stringer described what makes it hard: a large air base has fuel. maintenance. and control facilities. and dispersing every function makes each step more difficult. In Ukraine, the day-to-day reality has looked like constant movement under threat. “This war. especially in terms of the drone war. is like a cat-and-mouse game. ” said Taras Berezovets. the head of the military cooperation department of Ukraine’s Territorial Defense Forces. describing how quickly concealment and position matter.
For Western militaries, the investment question is unavoidable. Stringer’s warning implies a major shift in how command-and-control systems are built and funded—toward mobility. redundancy. survivability. and networked communications. It is a change that could make the job tougher. but the alternative is to keep command structures in places that threats are increasingly able to reach.
NATO’s air policing mission in northern Europe. including across the Baltic region. and its broader oversight across the Baltic Sea and Nordic region still depend on the alliance’s existing centers at Uedem. Germany. and in northern Norway. But the commander’s message is that the future won’t be run from only those fixed points.
The question facing NATO now is whether it can modernize fast enough to make distributed command practical—not just in exercises, but in the kind of air campaign where adversaries have both the range and the tools to hit the places that used to feel untouchable.
NATO air operations centers command and control Sir John Stringer Uedem Ramstein RAF Lakenheath drones missile threats Ukraine F-16 air policing