G7 critical – At this week’s G7 summit, leaders put critical-minerals cooperation back on the agenda as governments and manufacturers scramble to reduce dependence on China-linked refining, processing, and licensing. The plan leans on stockpiling, recycling, new financing,
The hardware race behind AI—servers, chips, electric vehicles, industrial robots, telecom gear, and defense systems—has a less visible opponent: the mineral supply chain.
At this week’s G7 summit. leaders returned that risk to the center of the agenda. pushing for alternatives to minerals that still depend on concentrated refining and processing tied to China. The question they now face is blunt: can governments and manufacturers finance enough refining. recycling. magnet production. and long-term purchase deals to make non-China options actually viable?.
A June 17 summit report described plans for closer cooperation on critical minerals. including stockpiling. recycling. and a platform supported by the International Energy Agency. The effort builds on the G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan and the Critical Minerals Production Alliance announced at the June 2025 summit in Kananaskis. Canada.
For technology manufacturers and buyers across APAC, the exposure isn’t limited to where the final products are assembled. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India, Vietnam, and other regional hubs may increasingly make higher-value electronics and infrastructure. But the minerals still have to be refined. processed. and licensed somewhere—and the supply-chain risk can follow the product all the way to the data center door. Even as AI data center growth intensifies pressure on regional power planning, final assembly doesn’t remove the underlying dependence.
China’s export controls have made that reality harder to ignore. In April 2025, Beijing restricted exports of several medium and heavy rare earth-related items. On Oct. 9, 2025, it announced broader controls covering rare earths, related technologies, and some foreign-made products that use Chinese-origin inputs or technology.
Then came a reprieve that still didn’t settle the market. China later suspended a range of those expanded Oct. 9 measures for one year, through Nov. 10, 2026. The pause lowered near-term pressure, but licensing rules can change again, and processing capacity remains highly concentrated.
The International Energy Agency put numbers around the concentration. It said China is the leading refiner for 19 of the 20 strategic minerals it tracks, with an average market share of about 70%.
That bottleneck reaches into multiple layers of the tech stack. Rare earth magnets are used in electric motors, robotics, drones, wind turbines, and industrial systems. Other critical minerals feed batteries. semiconductors. power electronics. and grid equipment—along with the power and cooling systems behind AI data centers.
The G7 push, in other words, is not just about paper plans for security. It comes down to financing—and to whether the pipeline can turn policy into supply.
New mines and refineries require more than statements of intent. They need long-term purchase commitments from automakers, battery makers, chip suppliers, cloud infrastructure vendors, robotics companies, and defense contractors. Offtake agreements sit at the heart of the strategy.
In October 2025, Canada followed the Kananaskis plan with 26 investments, partnerships, and measures meant to unlock $6.4 billion in critical minerals projects. Those efforts are described as intended to include offtake arrangements and co-investments with allied countries.
There are already signals of what “commitment” can look like. In July 2025, Apple committed to buy $500 million in rare earth magnets from MP Materials. The deal is tied to MP’s Fort Worth, Texas, facility and a rare earth recycling line at Mountain Pass, California.
APAC’s role is likely decisive because much of the demand sits in the region. Chipmakers. electronics manufacturers. battery suppliers. automakers. robotics firms. and defense contractors there can take mineral-security policy and turn it into bankable projects—especially as AI infrastructure buildouts push deeper into markets such as India.
The next real test, leaders will discover, won’t be speeches. It will be named projects, clear funding, long-term buyers, and participation from APAC companies that rely on these materials.
Without that, technology buyers could keep running into the same recurring disruptions: price swings, licensing shocks, and hardware supply constraints—exactly the kind of uncertainty the G7 is trying to shut out.
G7 critical minerals AI supply chain risk rare earth magnets China export controls International Energy Agency MP Materials MP Fort Worth Texas Mountain Pass recycling offtake agreements semiconductor minerals electric vehicle batteries robotics minerals data center power and cooling