Workshop simulates space and ground attacks across 180 days

attribution in – A workshop run with the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies tested how U.S. and allied commanders might respond to disaster-style scenarios that include attacks in space and on the ground—spanning days 0, 45, 60, 90, and 180. The exercise centered on one

The workshop began with a countdown. Participants were asked to step into a sequence of simulated events that unfolded on days 0. 45. 60. 90. and 180—each time bringing attacks in space and on the ground. In the rooms where the scenarios were played out, the pressure wasn’t just about what happens during a strike. It was about when commanders would finally feel they knew enough to act.

For U.S. and allied military leaders, the questions would likely arrive all at once: decide whether to respond, and then decide how. Some governments might lean toward diplomacy instead of immediate military reaction in some situations. If a military response becomes necessary. the workshop forced participants to confront a more difficult choice—whether to act in space. or in another domain such as land. sea. air. or cyber.

Those domains don’t sit in separate boxes. The workshop laid out a basic reality of modern operations: they are inextricably linked. Terrestrial infrastructure enables space operations, while space-based assets can support military activities on Earth. An attack on one is not neatly isolated—it reaches into the other.

Galbreath. speaking on the complexity of the topic. said conflict in space isn’t something that should come as a surprise. even if it remains difficult. The simulation’s timeline. and the way decisions were forced to land under uncertainty. reflected a central concern: it could take time to unravel what is happening. With delays, a U.S. response could be slowed.

Retired Air Force Col. Jennifer Reeves, a coauthor on the Mitchell Institute’s report, tied that delay to a problem that makes planning brittle. There are still few widely accepted definitions for what constitutes conflict in space. When definitions are unclear. decision-making can become slower. less certain. and more reactive—responding after events have already moved beyond the point where leaders could shape the outcome.

The workshop also tested something commanders can’t afford to ignore: people can be lulled into normalcy. GPS jamming and cyberattacks on space-related infrastructure are already happening, and it can be hard to determine who is behind them.

Reeves put it directly: attribution is central. Before leaders choose a credible response, they need confidence about what happened, who did it, how broad the effects were, and whether those effects were actually intentional.

But the simulation’s pressure points went further than uncertainty about intent. Reeves warned that ambiguity can create opportunity for adversaries. Repeated non-kinetic attacks—jamming. lasing. and cyber effects—can gradually normalize hostile behavior if they aren’t clearly identified and addressed over time. Over the course of repeated incidents. that normalization can desensitize leaders to actions that. in a different context. would be treated as deeply provocative.

In the workshop, participants described the dynamic in vivid terms: a “boiling the frog” effect. Reeves said the danger is what happens when pressure is applied slowly and persistently—the threshold for response keeps moving. In the scenarios played out across the span of 180 days, that shifting threshold was the quiet enemy. Not every problem would announce itself at full intensity from the start. Some would creep in through ambiguity, and through attacks that don’t look like traditional escalation until they add up.

space warfare conflict in space attribution GPS jamming cyberattacks non-kinetic attacks Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies U.S. military response