tanker readiness – A Government Accountability Office report finds the US Air Force’s KC-135 and KC-46A refueling tanker fleets have missed readiness standards every year from fiscal 2019 through fiscal 2025, raising concerns that even a growing reliance on tankers is running ah
Early in a mission, a refueling plan can decide whether aircraft make it home with fuel to spare—or with none.
In 2025 Midnight Hammer operations, fighter jet pilots later received award citations describing how they returned home “critically low” on fuel after encountering an “aerial refueling fallout” early on in the mission.
That kind of lived risk sits uncomfortably beside a new Government Accountability Office report concluding that the US Air Force’s tanker fleet has failed to meet its own availability and mission-capable standards every year since fiscal year 2019, through fiscal year 2025.
The findings cover two tanker families: the aging KC-135 Stratotanker and the newer KC-46A Pegasus. Both fleets, the report says, did not meet availability and mission-capable standards across the period from fiscal 2019 through fiscal 2025.
The GAO report also points to what it calls “sustainment risks” that the Air Force has identified. but says the service “has not comprehensively assessed these risks or developed a plan to mitigate them.” Those risks include shortages of critical repair parts. a lack of personnel needed to maintain aircraft. and “infrastructure limitations.”.
The report adds that the Air Force has taken some steps to address failures but still lacks a comprehensive plan to prevent future breakdowns. It also notes that specific “annual availability” figures and “mission-capable rates” for the tankers were not included because the Pentagon said those rates were too sensitive for public release.
Tankers are not just another support asset. They function as flying gas stations, extending the reach of other military aircraft—refueling fighter jets and bombers on long missions that outlast the fuel in their own tanks.
The Air Force’s dependence on that capability has intensified as tankers and their crews supported major recent operations. The report’s findings arrive as the military relied extensively on tankers and their skilled crews for last year’s strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. a major January raid into Venezuela to remove the country’s president. and throughout the war in Iran.
During that later war with Iran, tankers faced danger in the middle of combat operations. Refueling aircraft were damaged amid exchanges of fire, and six US service members were killed in March when their KC-135 Air Force tanker crashed while flying over Iraq.
The GAO report also highlights an operational mismatch that can be hard for outsiders to see: the Air Force tracks aircraft availability and readiness rates. but the way those metrics are detailed may not show whether a tanker that can fly can actually do its most important job—refueling another aircraft.
Tankers can be counted as “mission capable” as long as the plane can perform at least one assigned mission, and that does not necessarily mean refueling another aircraft.
That distinction matters because the fleet’s condition is shaped by two very different problems: age on the KC-135 side, and lingering system issues on the KC-46A side.
The KC-135 fleet is growing old. The aircraft first entered service in the 1950s, and new problems arise as older fleets wear down.
On the KC-46A, the report points to years of production delays and operational challenges, including problems with its refueling boom that transfers fuel to receiving aircraft, and issues with its remote vision system described as a rear-view camera.
Earlier this year. Air Force officials identified “critical deficiencies” with KC-46A systems. and additional concerns connected to Boeing’s “quality control procedures.” Those cited problems included “frequently failing electrical components on the boom. sensors that do not perform accurately. airframe cracks. and other structural issues.”.
The tanker fleet’s fuel capacity also underscores why readiness failures can have outsized consequences. The KC-135 tanker carries more than 212,000 pounds of fuel, while the KC-46A carries slightly less at 200,000 pounds.
Military aircraft experts have warned that tanker readiness is already under strain. In comments given to Business Insider last month. John Venable. a retired Air Force pilot and senior fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. said the Air Force is effectively “whistling past the graveyard.” He pointed to the refueling problems described in the fighter jet award citations and argued it points to a problem the Air Force is not confronting squarely. Venable said it is “unlikely the Air Force could support a major contingency operation based on the current status of its tankers.” He added: “It’s a very complicated situation. ” but ultimately. “the Air Force does not have enough tankers. ” or repair parts. “to be ready for a major fight.”.
In response to the GAO report’s findings. an Air Force spokesperson said the service “concurred with the report’s recommendations and is aggressively working to resolve readiness challenges so our tankers can continue to provide critical support to the warfighter.” The spokesperson also said the tanker fleet remains a cornerstone of US power projection. actively delivering vital refueling support around the globe.
The sequence is stark: repeated readiness shortfalls from fiscal 2019 through fiscal 2025. sustainment risks that have not been comprehensively assessed or mitigated. and real-world mission consequences described in award citations and tied to refueling problems—set against an Air Force effort that. so far. does not amount to a fully comprehensive plan.
For a fleet built to keep other aircraft in the air, the central question becomes whether tankers can do what they are meant to do, reliably, when the mission tempo and stakes are highest.
US Air Force aerial refueling KC-135 Stratotanker KC-46A Pegasus Government Accountability Office readiness mission-capable sustainment risks Boeing quality control repair parts infrastructure limitations