empty ceasefire – A U.S.-brokered interim ceasefire Trump signed for 60 days to pause Iran-and-Lebanon fighting includes reopening the Strait of Hormuz, barring Iran from a nuclear weapon, and waiving sanctions—yet Gaza’s “ceasefire” of last October remains, in the view of a Pa
When President Donald Trump signed an interim ceasefire on Wednesday meant to end military operations in Iran and Lebanon for 60 days. the agreement came packaged with sweeping geopolitical promises: it would reopen the Strait of Hormuz. bar Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. and require the White House to end its blockade and waive economic sanctions against Iran.
The deal also calls for the U.S. and regional partners to develop a “mutually” agreed upon reconstruction and economic development fund worth at least $300 billion—though the U.S. is not required to contribute.
In Washington, the language of ceasefires is often treated like a reset button. But for people tracking Gaza, the most urgent question isn’t what happens elsewhere in the region—it’s what doesn’t change on the ground there.
Tariq Kenney-Shawa. an associate fellow at Palestinian think tank Al-Shabaka. argued this week that the October 2025 ceasefire in Gaza has operated more like a political placeholder than a pause in violence. During the period since the October 2025 ceasefire was signed. Israeli military attacks have killed more than 1. 000 Palestinians in Gaza. according to Kenney-Shawa’s account. He described a pattern in which ceasefire language gives the appearance of progress while Israel continues airstrikes and expands territory.
Kenney-Shawa said that when the ceasefire was first framed as an organizing demand—“Ceasefire now”—it helped build a broad movement because the slogan was “vague enough to bring a lot of people into the movement against genocide.” He emphasized that the phrase also created momentum in the 2024 presidential campaign cycle and in congressional races that year. But. in his telling. the real groundwork it laid was for the potential of signing what he called “an empty ceasefire agreement. ” structured around steps on paper and a phased approach that did not translate into an enforceable halt.
The “continuing” part, Kenney-Shawa said, is not subtle. He said Israel refused to implement steps of the ceasefire agreement that includes continued daily airstrikes across the Gaza Strip. He also described Israel’s land control as shifting over time: at the beginning of the period he cited. Israel controlled about 53 percent of the Gaza Strip. marked by a yellow line that “chopped Gaza in half.” Now. he said. that line has been pushed further westward. forcing 2 million Palestinians into what he described as an ever-shrinking strip—now about 40 percent. and then 30 percent. of what the Gaza Strip was prior to the genocide.
Food, supplies, and access were part of the same argument. Kenney-Shawa said Israel refused to let in the full agreed amount of humanitarian aid. flooding the Strip with commercial aid that people can’t afford while denying sustainable products and items he said are necessary to survive—tents. building material. and equipment to dig people’s bodies out of rubble. He said the result is a “deliberate purgatory” for the 2 million Palestinians he described as trapped on the other side of the yellow line.
Kenney-Shawa’s concern goes beyond Gaza’s immediate devastation. He framed the ceasefire as enabling Israeli leaders to redirect attention and resources to other fronts—especially as Gaza slips from the public’s focus when other regional crises dominate headlines.
That framing was central to a discussion connected to what’s happening now in Iran and Lebanon. During the same conversation. Al-Shabaka’s Kenney-Shawa argued that Gaza should be seen as “the elephant in the room” within a broader cycle of war. He said Israel’s ability to agree to a “pseudo-ceasefire” in Gaza allowed it to direct more time and military manpower toward fighting in Iran. going on the offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon. and maintaining hold of occupied territory in Syria.
He said the likely consequence. if the Iran front quiets down. is that Israel would have “a lot more resources” and “a lot more manpower” to turn back toward Gaza. In the meantime, he argued that Israel’s demand for progress in the ceasefire process is selective. He said Israel has not implemented phase one parts of the agreement but is demanding that Hamas agree to a component of phase two—disarmament.
Hamas, Kenney-Shawa said, has rejected that demand, tying any movement on phase two to steps that he says Israel refused to take, including stopping bombing campaigns, letting in humanitarian aid, and adhering to the ceasefire agreement’s provisions.
The idea that “ceasefire” can be weaponized—used to create political cover without delivering relief—was echoed by the way the discussion traced the term’s role in U.S. politics. In the interview. Jonah Valdez. a reporter at The Intercept who covers politics and Israel and Palestine. described how “ceasefire” became a rallying cry during the 2024 campaign cycle as pro-Palestinian protesters pressed for Palestinian rights.
Valdez argued that what followed was a “Trump-concocted ceasefire” with “a fake ceasefire” effect in Gaza—bombing continuing after the October 2025 agreement. He said Israel has continued the bombing campaign in Gaza and that the ceasefire term “doesn’t apply in Gaza.”
Where the conversation turned most directly toward U.S. political stakes was in Kenney-Shawa’s warning that ceasefire language can also distract from more enforceable pressure—particularly sanctions and arms embargoes—and from broader efforts to change how the U.S. and Israeli militaries are intertwined.
He said that criticism of Israel in the U.S. is rising. and that Israeli and American leaders recognize a shift away from an earlier “special” dependency—militarily and financially—toward deeper entrenchment. He argued that Israel’s strategy is to push new initiatives through while a political window exists. describing a Trump administration he said is willing to “do whatever we want” and a Senate and House where Republicans hold majorities.
Among the initiatives he raised is Section 224 of the fiscal year 2027 National Defense Authorization Act. which he described as proposing “an unprecedented integration” of the U.S. military-industrial complex and Israeli defense and technology sectors. Kenney-Shawa said this kind of entrenchment makes it harder for pro-Palestine movements to decouple the two systems. describing it as dangerous because it gives U.S. military-industrial access that he said no other country—he compared to the U.K. and France—has.
He also pointed to an ongoing negotiation over a memorandum of understanding between Israel and the U.S. saying a prior one was signed under the Obama administration: a 10-year MOU that he said agreed to provide Israel $3.8 billion every year of U.S. tax dollars. He said the proposed new MOU would run 20 years, include a couple of years of increased U.S. military aid before decreasing, and increase interdependence between militaries.
The most human part of the account didn’t come from policy language at all. Kenney-Shawa grounded his arguments in family history—anchoring his frustration that Gaza is being reduced to a phrase, a framework, a slogan when real people are living through the aftermath.
He said he is Palestinian American, born in New York. He described asking his parents about whether he had to advocate for Palestinian rights. saying they were hoping he wouldn’t have to. He said he first encountered political reality in middle school when he told a friend’s father he was from Palestine. Kenney-Shawa said the man responded that Palestine “doesn’t exist,” a shock he said only made sense later.
He said his father grew up in Gaza until college age, and that hearing his stories—especially after a 2008 Israeli offensive on the Gaza Strip—“awakened” him to the “real weight” of being Palestinian and pushed him toward activism.
Kenney-Shawa also spoke about his aunt, Laila Shawa, a Palestinian visual artist from Gaza, and about his aunt Rawya Shawa, a Palestinian journalist and legislator. He said Rawya lost her home in the 2008 offensive from an Israeli strike, and that Israeli tanks had shelled her home before that.
In the interview, he said one of the hardest parts is that the prospect of returning to Gaza has been fading. “That’s been one of the most difficult parts,” he said, “just knowing that we might never, never go back.”
As the discussion moved back to what comes next in U.S. organizing. Kenney-Shawa argued that the movement has to shift toward punitive measures like economic sanctions and arms embargoes—something he said must go “past” the earlier “Ceasefire now” demands and “conditioning aid” demands. He described a fear that if pressure stays focused only on conditioning. Israel could still buy weapons on the open market. avoiding restrictions while continuing violence.
He warned that time is not on anyone’s side. In his view, Gaza’s “pseudo-ceasefire” isn’t merely failing—it is shaping the conditions under which future violence can continue.
And against the backdrop of a 60-day ceasefire signed for Iran and Lebanon, the contrast landed sharply: peace language can move policy in one direction while leaving the killing in Gaza unchanged in practice.
Gaza ceasefire Trump interim ceasefire Iran Lebanon Strait of Hormuz Israel Hamas arms embargo sanctions Al-Shabaka Tariq Kenney-Shawa U.S.-Israel relationship Section 224 NDAA memorandum of understanding