cheap drones – A top NATO commander says the West’s long-running air-defense model—expensive missiles and highly centralized command—doesn’t match the reality of cheap, mass-produced drones and fast, multi-direction air attacks. Sir John Stringer warned that “the days” of re
For years. NATO planning has leaned on a familiar comfort: advanced jets. expensive missiles. and the ability to intercept nearly everything in the air. But in a world of cheap drones launched in large numbers. that old playbook is starting to strain—so much so that a senior NATO commander says the logic itself no longer holds.
Sir John Stringer. NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe. warned that new air threats capable of overwhelming conventional approaches are emerging fast. “The days of thinking that you can sit back and be reactive and engage every threat that comes at you using traditional means like fast jets and some surface-to-air missiles … those days are over. ” he said.
Stringer pointed to lessons already visible in wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. Western forces have historically benefited from total or near-total control of the air against weaker adversaries. The next challenge. he said. may be different: NATO could face major militaries like Russia or China. while smaller actors also gain access to cheap drones that can be launched in large numbers to overwhelm defenses.
That shift forces a different posture. “We’re going to have to deal in the reactive sense of stuff coming at us in a different way,” Stringer said, including by using new drone types to stop drone attacks and relying on electronic warfare.
The commander did not dismiss advanced aircraft and missiles. He said Western militaries still need them. But he argues the West also needs large numbers of cheaper defenses because the number of threats in the air has grown—along with the range of what threatens it.
“The threat is now everything from cheap air systems, uncrewed air systems, drones at one end of the spectrum to air-launched ballistic missiles” and hypersonic weapons, at the other, he said.
For NATO, the question becomes how to defend without trying to solve everything with multimillion-dollar interceptors. Stringer called this one of the “biggest changes” facing Western militaries. saying they now need defenses at scale and that some areas will require “play catch-up.” The response. he said. must be “on the right part of what we call the cost curve” — meaning it can’t keep using costly interceptors against far cheaper targets.
The mismatch, he said, is stark when comparing US-made Patriot air defense missiles with Shahed-style drones fielded by Iran and Russia. Stringer warned that using Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) interceptors against Shahed one-way attack drones would be “unsustainable.”
He put numbers behind the concern. Iran’s Shahed one-way attack drones cost an estimated $20,000 to $50,000 each. Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) interceptors are estimated to cost roughly $3.7 million each, and he said stockpiles are strained and take a long time to replenish.
That economic pressure has already triggered alarm inside NATO. Officials and military leaders have warned that while advanced defenses remain necessary, they can no longer be the only type of defense Western militaries rely on.
Some of the answers, Stringer said, are already taking shape through Ukraine. He cited Ukraine’s development of cheap interceptor drones that can be used against drone attacks instead of expensive missiles. He said partner nations are following that approach. He also said the West needs cheaper sensors like the ones Ukraine uses to detect drones. alongside the more powerful systems NATO is used to fielding.
Even so, Stringer argued that defense alone is not enough. He returned to a doctrine the West has used for around 100 years: “your defense needs a good offense.” In his view, Western forces must be able to hit the places where incoming weapons are made.
“You’ll hear people talk about going against the archer, not just the arrow. That’s true up to a point,” Stringer said. “But I actually want to go after the places where the arrows are made.” He added that it can’t be just “hoping to deal with everything that comes at you.”
At the industrial level. he said NATO members need to scale their industrial bases—not only through defense companies. but across broader industry. He pointed to Ukraine as an example. saying it is developing and fielding new weaponry at speed and that having more companies ready to adapt for war has shown value.
He focused on the churn inside the drone market too. If you look at innovative drone companies in the West, Stringer asked, “how many of them were even in existence five years ago, let alone how many of them spawned out the kind of traditional defense background or defense industrial background?”
Still, investments in defenses may not be enough when threats in the air multiply. Officials and analysts warn that in a serious, large-scale future war, Western countries might not be able to protect everything. Instead. countries may be forced into difficult choices about what to protect as adversaries target military sites. cities. and civilian infrastructure.
The stakes extend beyond overseas deployments. Stringer warned that the air threat also changes the assumption of safety at home. In a large-scale war, Western countries can no longer count on their homelands remaining safe while their militaries fight overseas. Missiles and drones can threaten places previously considered secure in the rear.
The shift is already challenging air superiority itself. Officials have warned that full control of the air may not be possible. Stringer referenced a warning from Gen. David Allvin. when he was the Chief of Staff of the US Air Force. saying Ukraine’s fight showed the US that it might not be able to enjoy “ubiquitous air supremacy for days and weeks on end” and that it may instead be possible only in small bursts.
Stringer said securing control of the air still has to be a priority, even if methods change. “You still need to secure air superiority,” he said. “The ways of doing it may change, but it fundamentally provides a foundation on which the entire joint force operates. So if you’re not able to secure the access and then the maneuver that your force needs. then you’re failing.”.
He also said NATO may need to rethink how it oversees and coordinates air activity. The West has used large command centers to coordinate air patrols and air warfare—directing what aircraft do. seeing what they observe. and deciding how defenses should be used. But he said “that’s going to have to change.”.
Those command centers, he argued, will need to be more dispersed so they are harder to target, even if that makes air operations more complicated.
The core message from Stringer is blunt: in a reality shaped by cheap drones and mass air attacks. the West can’t rely on a single. expensive answer for every problem. It needs defenses that match the cost and volume of the threats. a stronger offensive to reach where weapons originate. and command systems that can survive the very targeting they are built to manage.
NATO Sir John Stringer air defense drones Patriot PAC-3 Shahed cost curve electronic warfare Ukraine air superiority industrial base