Ahead of the 2024 election, election workers and local officials are wary of the Department of Homeland Security’s role in election security—pointing to Markwayne Mullin’s history of election-denial statements, DHS staffing shifts at CISA, and repeated federal
When it comes to election security this year, some of the people tasked with protecting voting systems have started to treat the federal government less like a shield—and more like a possible hazard.
Across the political spectrum. numerous local election officials told NPR they are avoiding sharing voter data or other security information with the federal government because they fear it could be used against them. Matt Crane. a former Republican county clerk who now runs Colorado’s professional organization for local election officials. said. “I’m actively discouraging it.” Crane added. “I don’t trust how the administration is using that data. I don’t trust that they’re going to keep it confidential. And so I can’t in good conscience advocate that any of my counties do any work with them right now.”.
The anxiety has a face and a paper trail: Markwayne Mullin, now the head of the Department of Homeland Security, is tied to long-running election-denial efforts and, in the eyes of many local officials, is leading a department that they worry will help undermine outcomes rather than secure them.
Gary Berntsen, a former CIA operative who is convinced Venezuela stole the 2020 U.S. election, has promoted conspiracy theories for years. In an interview in the fall with conservative podcaster Lara Logan. Berntsen said. “One of the things that we learned is there’s 14 different technical ways that you can steal an election.” He said he couldn’t get people to listen—including the FBI and the media—before turning to Congress. where he claims he was rebuffed by almost everyone. including Republicans. “Except one.”.
“That politician in America was not afraid,” Berntsen told Logan. “It was Markwayne Mullin of Oklahoma.” Allies of Berntsen say Mullin—then a U.S. senator. now DHS secretary—brokered a meeting at Mar-a-Lago so Berntsen could brief President Trump’s team on conspiracy theories about Venezuelan interference in elections.
That is only one episode, allies and critics say, in Mullin’s broader pattern of backing election-denial narratives. In a post dated Jan. 2. 2021. Mullin wrote online. “[D]ue to all of the fraud and uncertainty surrounding the 2020 election there is no way I can vote to certify the Electoral College.” Four days later. after a mob overran the U.S. Capitol during the certification, Mullin was one of 147 congressional Republicans who still voted not to certify the results.
Local officials who are uneasy about DHS’s role say those earlier statements matter now—especially against the backdrop of how DHS’s election-security operation is currently organized. In a statement to NPR about this story. DHS said Secretary Mullin is “committed to restoring integrity to our election systems and ensuring that American citizens. and only American citizens. are electing American leaders.” But many people working around federal election security point to changes that have left them doubting the department’s willingness—or ability—to operate as a trusted partner.
Several of the people who worked on election security issues within the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). at least within that agency. were pushed out or resigned last year. CISA. which Trump created in his first term. has also been without a Senate-confirmed leader for the entirety of Trump’s second term.
Paul Lux. a Republican election supervisor in Okaloosa County. Florida. said the federal government told local officials it was still providing the same cybersecurity services as it had during the Biden administration and Trump’s first term—but he said he has not heard of any Florida counties receiving services from the agency recently. “You know. try calling somebody at CISA and see who answers the phone. ” Lux said in an interview earlier this year. “Because at the end of the day it’s been radio silence from CISA when we reach out about just about anything.”.
When NPR requested comment. a CISA spokesperson said the agency provides “state and local election officials. upon request. no-cost voluntary services such as the sharing of threat information. technical expertise. vulnerability scanning. and resilience-building support.” The spokesperson did not say how many election jurisdictions have received services during Trump’s second term.
For Lux and others. the bigger issue is not only what services arrive—it’s what relationship exists when local election systems are trying to protect themselves. Lux chaired the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC). a national cybersecurity partnership for local and state election officials created after Russia’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 U.S. election revealed how thin the threat-sharing lines were across the country.
EI-ISAC. which offers tools like endpoint protection and malicious domain blocking. as well as best practices. was originally funded by the federal government for its first seven years. In 2025, the Trump administration zeroed out that funding as part of its DOGE cuts. Election officials have been baffled by how defunding and other DHS cuts square with Trump’s language about securing U.S. elections.
“It’s meant that we as states have had to rebuild networks to protect our respective states from foreign interference. That’s not easy. And we can never replicate what the federal government has built and had done. ” said Jocelyn Benson. Michigan’s Democratic secretary of state and a candidate for governor.
EI-ISAC tried to adapt last year by scrambling to create a membership model funded by its county and state members. But the organization told NPR that membership is less than 20% of what it was before the federal funding cut. “So that collective collaboration is unfortunately becoming more fractured,” Lux said.
This month, Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., introduced legislation meant to restore funding for a broader threat-sharing service that covers all local governments. There is no indication the bill will gain traction.
Even the internal mechanics of communication are harder without federal support, according to people running the system. Marci Andino. the executive director of EI-ISAC and a former South Carolina election official. said the “big challenge” is reaching the thousands of election jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions are eligible to join for free because their state pays for a membership plan. but Andino said it has been difficult to contact all of them and keep them informed. “We’re continuing to get the message out that the EI-ISAC still exists,” Andino said. “We’re having to say, ‘Hey, we’re still here.’”.
EI-ISAC is also planning a new virtual “situation room” for elections. On Election Day. election officials can log on to share the physical or cyber threats they are encountering in real time. and see whether other local governments are confronting the same problems. The organization told NPR there was no such space during the off-year elections last year. EI-ISAC says the virtual room will be offered this year. All members will be invited, but no one from DHS will be there.
The contrast between what Mullin said when he was preparing to take his current role and what local election officials are experiencing now is part of what fuels the mistrust.
At his confirmation hearing in March, Mullin said DHS agents would only be present at polling places if there was a specific threat at those locations. DHS also says it is focused on ensuring only American citizens are electing American leaders.
But the federal posture toward elections has already alarmed local administrators. The Trump administration has taken what it called unprecedented steps to investigate local election administration—taking states to court to seek private voter registration data. and attempting. and in some cases succeeding. to access voting machines and ballots.
The administration has also signaled openness to deploying immigration enforcement around voting this fall, which would run against federal law. White House border czar Tom Homan told The Charlie Kirk Show this spring, “They say illegal aliens don’t vote. But … part of DHS’ job is [to] secure elections. and I’m not going to say. you know. what our plan is going forward.” He added. “But if only U.S. citizens can vote, I don’t see the issue.”.
Crane. the Colorado election official. said he hears those signals alongside misinformation concerns tied to the DHS elections point person. Heather Honey. who he said has a long history spreading election misinformation. “All of this points to the fact that these are not trusted partners anymore,” Crane said. “They’ve brought the fox into the henhouse.”.
In Florida. Lux described the federal relationship as damaged—and suggested it could take a long time to repair. even if federal officials try to re-engage. If the federal government wants a role in election security again at some point. Lux said. they’ll be invited back—though skeptically. “[They’ll] probably be that uncle that we keep at arm’s length at Thanksgiving rather than giving him a big bear hug. ” he said. “But, you know, we’ll have to see. Certainly the relationship has been damaged. And how long it takes to rebuild that trust will depend on how dedicated they are to trying to rebuild that trust.”.
Department of Homeland Security Markwayne Mullin CISA EI-ISAC election security local election officials voter data Heather Honey Trump administration Tom Homan 2024 election Congress Mark Warner