Europe debates war now; 2026 tests its nerve

Europe’s 2026 – In a conversation about 2025’s political shocks and 2026’s uncertain direction, Ivan Krastev describes “revolution” as a change in the identity of political actors and the overwhelming speed of events. He traces how tariffs, security doctrine, and shifting pub

The year 2025 didn’t feel slow. It felt like someone had shoved Europe onto the fast track—without a map, without consensus, and with the destination constantly redrawn by whoever held the mic.

In conversation with Mirjana Tomić. political scientist Ivan Krastev tried to explain why he kept reaching for the word “revolution” as the year unfolded. He said his earlier predictions were “so vague” they could not be “totally wrong. ” but insisted the real lesson was experiential: what it feels like to move from a slow train to a fast one. where “the speed” overwhelms you even if you don’t know the destination.

For Krastev. revolution is not simply a change of power—power changes “almost all the time.” What makes it revolutionary is the change in the identity of political actors. In a span of just one year. he said. Donald Trump managed to change the identity of the United States as a global player. He also linked revolution to speed—events moving quickly. and minds having to move faster too. especially for generations that have watched major political change occur in their lifetimes.

And then. he added. revolution carries an almost cruel clarity: suddenly you begin to understand that “the future is going to be different” from the world as it looks today. He recalled how people talk about 2026 through forecasts and symbols—even citing Nostradamus. whose interpretation is framed as a coming “swarm of bees. ” read by commentators as political turmoil.

That sense of surprise is not abstract for Krastev. He described how predictions often rely on looking back to the past. and on the comfort of believing you know what won’t happen. He used a joke about 1963—“if Khrushchev and not Kennedy was killed”—to make a point about the illusions built into forecasting. What you expect not to happen, he said, disciplines the way you think.

Krastev’s argument landed differently when he turned from general political motion to what people believe about the next year. He said he was involved in a global survey of twenty-one countries run by the European Council on Foreign Relations. to be announced on 15 January. Comparing 2024 with 2025, he highlighted four shifts.

First, he said, the majority of people surveyed expect China to rise next year. After the first year of Trump’s presidency framed around “America first. ” opinion has shifted toward “China first.” He stressed that even Americans are increasingly convinced China is rising—because of technology. manufacturing. and trade.

Second, he said the data shows people are not afraid of that shift. In international relations, he explained, a new hegemon usually triggers backlash and coalitions to contain it. In their data on China so far, he said, that backlash is not showing.

Third, he described the world’s emotional split into pessimists and optimists. He said societies in Europe. the US. South Korea. and Turkey are more pessimistic. while India is the major champion of optimism. China and Brazil are also optimistic. he added. though he said he “don’t take very much” from Russia and Ukraine. describing their optimism as war-conditioned—“when you’re at war. you’re either optimistic or you’re dead.” He also pointed to Mexico. where optimism is directed not at the world. but at Mexico’s place in it.

Finally, he said Europe’s image has changed dramatically. For the first time, he said, Russians in the survey believe Europe, not the US, is their major enemy. He contrasted that with an American divide: he said 40% of Americans still view Europe as an ally. while only 16% of Europeans view the US as an ally—“a big change in just one year.”.

But for all the survey numbers, the most destabilizing moments in the conversation came when Krastev moved into war, security, and what Europeans are being asked to live with.

He began with tariffs, dismissing the idea that they would cause the market rupture some liberal economists expected. He said the expected economic shock “hasn’t happen.” Instead. he argued. rapid change produces a different effect: companies trade on expectations. and people can’t plan their lives when changes come quickly. He said inflation becomes especially painful for politics because it destroys everyday expectations—making people “extremely nervous” and “anxious.” In that frame. he said tariffs were important. even if they did not work as expected. because people adapted.

From there, he turned to the US national security strategy—describing it as a document that reads like a transcript of Trump’s mind, where advisors try to capture how he sees the world. He said three things matter most.

The most surprising. he said. was the strategy’s outline on Africa: “only half a page.” He called that a shock given that it is estimated that 40% of the world’s population will come from Africa. He contrasted that with 1900, when only 8% lived in Africa; when 25% lived in Europe. By 2100, he said, only 6% of the world’s population is expected to come from Europe. In his view, it is striking that a security strategy ignores a continent likely to drive a major demographic boom.

He then addressed Latin America and the renewed talk of the Monroe Doctrine and spheres of influence. He argued that spheres are no longer clear-cut: during the Cold War. trade and political alignment with either the Soviets or the Americans made the logic visible. Now, he said, almost everybody trades with China, and nearly 50% of the world’s industrial production comes from China. He said the question is less about formal blocs and more about technology—framing geopolitical loyalty through who you share data with.

When asked about the goal of stopping China’s influence in Latin America. he pushed back on what it would actually mean in practice. He said you might try to keep Chinese technologies out, and that attempts would be met with counter-efforts. But he argued that awareness of spheres of influence is easier to write about than to practice.

Then came the irony he said Americans have introduced regarding Europe itself. He said the major accusation from President Trump is that Europe became too Americanized—referring to how. in Europe. multiculturalism and going beyond a classical nation state were often perceived as Americanization. Then. he said. America “suddenly” decided it doesn’t like that Americanized Europe. demanding a return to how it used to be.

For Krastev, migration sharpened the picture further. “We’re living in a world where everyone is a migrant. ” he said. and described the difference as where migrants come from. Most migrants. he argued. come from outside the West and arrive with hope for the future. while many right-wing voters vote “for migrating back in time.” The result. he said. is a political world where “nobody feels comfortable where they are.”.

He also said that in 2025 the US president started to behave “like a monarch. ” describing actions such as taking a gift and a plane from Qatar. He said he. as a Bulgarian. cannot get “outraged about corruption” in the simple sense. but that the deeper point is “naked power”—the message that some people are more important than others.

From “naked power” to Europe’s war calculus was not a leap in his account; it was part of the same shift: how authority behaves, how it shapes daily life, and what citizens are asked to imagine.

Asked about the most important conversation of 2025, Krastev offered one that, at first, sounded almost surreal. He pointed to a conversation between President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin. when they didn’t know the mic was on. in which they talked about some people living to 150 years old and even about “the transfer of organs.” He said the conversation was dramatic. asking readers to imagine leaders who believe they can live that long. because it changes the meaning of power and legacy.

He extended the thought experiment to the possibility of living to 250, describing how it would leave a world of “a few ‘immortals’ and a lot of mortals,” reshaping social inequality to a degree far beyond what people discuss today.

Then the conversation returned to Europe’s “mortals.” Krastev had written that Europe. once a peace project. is becoming a war project after Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Tomić referenced comments attributed to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte about the war possibly resembling what grandparents or great-grandparents endured. and to a French Army Chief saying young people should be prepared to die—she noted she was paraphrasing.

Yet she also set a second reality beside those warnings: according to a Politico poll she said she read that morning, 45% of people in Germany and 37% in France are against increasing support for the war in Ukraine, and are in favour of decreasing support for Ukraine.

That contrast—official language of endurance and public resistance to deepening support—gave the conversation its sharpest tension.

Krastev’s answer was grounded in what he said Europe’s project originally achieved: making war in Europe unthinkable. He said Europeans weren’t naive enough to believe there was no war. but that it became difficult to imagine not a conflict but a big war. What he said is happening in Ukraine is a big war. and he put a marker in time: by January next year. Russia’s war against Ukraine would have lasted longer than the Soviet-Nazi war of 1941-1945.

What changed, he said, is the fear that war is possible again. He described how European societies compare their situation to historical templates and come to different conclusions. He traced the arguments back to 1913 versus 1939: for those warning not to “provoke. ” the logic is that buying more weapons and giving more support might bring war closer. For others. he said. the comparison is 1939 and Munich—warnings that if you don’t stop someone now. they’ll come over.

He said he doesn’t believe it’s like 1913 or 1939, but that these stories still reflect the “basic reaction” of people. He offered a rule of thumb: in Europe, he said, people may share common dreams, but their nightmares are national—Poles, for instance, he said, were shaped by 1939.

He warned that governments should try to take positions. but he raised a question about defence spending: if spending isn’t popular. extremist governments can win. He also argued that on the other side, it is difficult to gauge what Russia is ready to do. In political science, he said, you don’t analyse intentions but capabilities. “Capabilities define intentions,” he said.

When Tomić said politicians’ declarations about war coming were increasing. Krastev responded with a different constraint: on one level. governments mobilize populations—but he said people aren’t ready to die. He said, since the end of the Cold War, sacrifice is no longer part of the social contract. That change. he argued. is part of why Europe is a post-heroic society: societies can sense threat. but they don’t feel they can mobilize the younger generation.

He connected that to a prediction: over the next ten years, he said, Europe will see major proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The conversation also moved to NATO, which he said changed dramatically in 2025. He described NATO as a kind of religion in Europe—especially Eastern Europe—where security questions ended conversations by default. He compared that certainty to the Maginot line for France, which was built on the belief it would protect them.

In his view, NATO’s effectiveness is tied to American commitment. He said there is no treaty that can defend you on its own; the only real defence is the readiness of the security partner to be part of it. With Donald Trump, he said, Europeans cannot take that for granted.

He tied that to geography and fear: because there are many American soldiers on German and Polish territory. Europeans assumed the Americans would come. But he said the threat of US military withdrawal forces Europeans to imagine defence without Americans—especially for smaller countries like the Baltics—when it comes not to total nuclear war but aggressive provocation. That, he said, changes European maps.

Tomić asked if Europe has a defence strategy for when Americans don’t come. Krastev answered that strategy documents exist, but the problem is institutions’ reactions and what people will do. He warned against trusting opinion polls about how people behave in moments of war.

He offered an example from Ukraine in 2021: he said 25% of the population was “very sceptical” about the government. and many believed Ukraine could not defend itself. Then. he said. when the moment arrived. those sceptics risked their lives. volunteered. and fought for four years against a larger country with a larger army and economy. He framed it as a psychological moment that can’t easily be predicted, not even by strategy.

He predicted Europe will increase defence capabilities, but said a key problem is who decides what weapons are needed. In the American case. he said. the Pentagon tells companies what it needs—“we need drones” or “we need planes.” In Europe. he said. defence companies may start deciding what to produce because Europe lacks an army and a single government that can decide.

He also addressed the question embedded in Tomić’s last line: whether people should take the boat or plane to Latin America. He said the places you can go have changed. He described a paradox: crises might be felt in Europe. but from the outside Europe is seen as prosperous and stable. That makes escape harder, he suggested, even when the idea is tempting.

The deepest emotional turn in the conversation came when Tomić asked whether Europe is learning to live with wars and the far right approaching power as something normal. Krastev rejected the comforting idea that this is merely the wolf-cry that never comes. He said Europe is in an exceptional historical period. but that it can start to look normal because of new media.

He said war is visible “in real time. ” but he questioned what people are actually seeing. arguing that images are out of context. Then he contrasted television with lived reality. He described Ukraine. especially eastern Ukraine. where electricity is available only six to twelve hours a day in much of the country. He said you don’t know how long the cuts will continue, and that it changes life. He described broken sleep and shelter routines every night with family.

To explain the psychological difference, he asked the listener to imagine one month of that rhythm—getting up every night at 12 o’clock, spending four hours somewhere, then returning. He said the mind changes, and “this isn’t television” because television can be switched off.

He returned to an old film he remembered about a gardener who switches remote channels constantly until. when attacked. the channel-change doesn’t work. In his view. Europe is sometimes like that gardener: it tries to change the channel when a crisis arrives. but the crisis is not television. “We are on the street,” he said.

When asked what to expect for Europe in 2026, Krastev chose three points.

First. he said to expect a type of ceasefire in Ukraine. one way or another. “probably not now as expected. but later.” He added that it could have different contours. If it becomes a “dirty kind of peace” that Ukrainians won’t accept. he said a major migration crisis would follow. and it would not be wives and children. He predicted that a wave of ex-soldiers coming to Europe would create a major issue given Europe’s political dynamics.

Second, he said the Hungarian election in April will be critically important. He described how the Hungarian government matters in Europe’s new political constellation. especially since President Trump has made clear his political preferences and friends. He said Viktor Orbán is not only Trump’s oldest friend in Europe but. in his view. “also the most strategically on side.” He argued that intellectual. financial. and institutional infrastructure of the European far right is based in Hungary. and that relations between the European far right and the American MAGA movement run through Hungarian channels.

He said if Orbán wins, it would consolidate the Trumpian right across Europe. If Orbán loses, he said it would be an irony—an “Orbán, far-right moment”—but history, he warned, has a sense of humour and could go “both ways.”

Before he moved to the third point, Tomić asked whether the US or Russia has more influence on upcoming elections in Europe. Krastev said it depends on the country, but he believes it’s the US.

His third point was the American mid-term elections. He said they won’t change much in the US itself. but if the Democrats win big. Trump would look weak. In that case, he said, the major story becomes how the European Trumpian right decides its strategy. He warned that with a polarized US. each change of American president becomes a regime change in Europe—Republicans pushing strong anti-liberal movements. then Democrats countering far right politics.

He described a possible window for renegotiations inside European political parties. including far-right parties. to look for European consensus on the role of Europe in the world and its strategic relations with the US regardless of who is in power. He said part of the story is that European politics has become so polarized that there is almost no external threat that can consolidate it. pointing to Poland as one example.

He returned to what he said people should watch: a ceasefire prospect in Ukraine, the Hungarian election’s possible outcomes, and what happens when Trump looks weaker and how that reshapes calculations across Europe.

And then he closed on the most unsettling prediction: the most important thing about 2026 will be something they are not talking about today. Psychologically, he said, when people expect to see something, they aren’t surprised by it. It is the unexpected that shapes political reality.

That event took place on 16 December 2025 as part of the Music and Politics series organized by Dessy Gavrilova and Mirjana Tomić, with music by Vikram Rajan. It was supported by the Erste Foundation, Forum for Journalism and Media (fjum) and Presseclub Concordia, and held at Presseclub Concordia.

Ivan Krastev Mirjana Tomić Europe 2025 politics 2026 outlook Ukraine ceasefire Hungary election April Vladimir Putin Xi Jinping NATO nuclear weapons tariffs Monroe Doctrine European far right MAGA cultural identity