Brazilian Drug Cartels Shift Smuggling Routes to Regional Ports Amid Tightened Santos Security
The tightening of customs enforcement at the Port of Santos, Latin America’s largest maritime terminal, has pushed international drug trafficking operators to disperse their logistics networks to other ports across Brazil. Federal investigations examined by authorities indicate that major criminal factions, including the First Capital Command and the Red Command, have shifted their export routes toward terminal facilities in the South and North. Affected locations include Paranaguá in Paraná, along with Itajaí, Navegantes, Itapoá, Imbituba, and São Francisco do Sul in Santa Catarina, alongside Santana in Amapá near the French Guiana border. Analysts note that this geographic shift highlights a systemic vulnerability: without robust public policy supporting the Federal Revenue Service, which holds constitutional precedence in customs surveillance and suppression, the nation’s borders, ports, and airports remain exposed to organized crime.
The evolution of these smuggling networks demonstrates a high degree of adaptability. In 2023, the Port of Paranaguá became the focal point of a thwarted operation by the First Catarense Group to dispatch at least one hundred kilograms of cocaine overseas. Although authorities seized the shipment, investigators suspect other consignments bypassed detection entirely. This capability reflects the substantial financial resources and sophisticated operational apparatus maintained by criminal syndicates, which continuously alter their supply chains to evade customs inspections. Rather than favoring a single corridor, traffickers target the most vulnerable links in international trade. Once enforcement is strengthened at a major hub like Santos, operations migrate to quieter or less-guarded terminals.
The transnational scope of the enterprise was underscored in 2021 with the arrest of Italian nationals Vincenzo Pasquino and Rocco Morabito, identified as vital bridges between the ‘Ndrangheta mafia and the First Capital Command. Extradited to Italy, the pair operated within a multi-billion-reais framework involving complex logistics networks supported by European criminal organizations. Official figures illustrate the scale of the challenge. A Federal Court of Accounts audit released in March 2026 revealed that approximately 40 percent of the cocaine seized within Brazil—totaling 155 tonnes—was recovered in port areas. International reporting indicates that criminal networks, including Nigerian groups allied with Brazilian factions, move roughly 20 tonnes of cocaine annually from Brazil toward the French market by exploiting commercial trade flows. To elude interdiction, traffickers increasingly utilize fishing boats, sailboats, and semi-submersible vessels alongside standard commercial containers.
Enforcement data from the Federal Revenue Service underscores the persistent flow of contraband. On a single Tuesday, authorities intercepted 702 kilograms of cocaine hidden within a coffee shipment scheduled to depart Santos for Europe. The geographic expansion extends beyond southern waters. The 2024 Paraíba Connection Operation targeted international drug routes operating through northeastern facilities such as Suape in Pernambuco, Pecém in Ceará, and Cabedelo in Paraíba, alongside Fortaleza, Salvador, and Natal, an apparatus estimated to have moved approximately four billion reais over six years. In Amapá, the seizure of 155 kilograms of cocaine at the Port of Santana marked an unprecedented event for the region during a two-year operational window. Meanwhile, in Rio de Janeiro, the Red Command has engaged in territorial disputes to control access corridors to the ports of Rio de Janeiro and Itaguaí and Guanabara Bay, aiming to expand international export platforms.
Despite severe personnel constraints, the Federal Revenue Service continues to execute high-profile interceptions. In May 2025, customs agents blocked the export of 156 kilograms of cocaine concealed within timber at Paranaguá bound for Australia. Subsequent actions included the seizure of 1.5 tonnes of cocaine hidden in paper cargo at Santos in June 2025, and the November 2025 interception of 300 bottles of liquid cocaine destined for Slovenia via the Itajaí and Navegantes complex. In December 2025, inspectors at Belo Horizonte International Airport in Confins recorded the largest airport drug seizure in national history, recovering approximately 1.2 tonnes of pure cocaine concealed inside furniture. Across Santa Catarina ports alone, cocaine seizures surpassed 2.3 tonnes throughout 2025.
Criminal methods have grown increasingly sophisticated, employing concealment techniques such as black cocaine—a mixture of the drug with activated charcoal and chemical agents designed to evade sniffer dogs and rapid field tests—as well as liquid formulations dissolved in water or solvents. To counter these tactics, customs authorities utilize risk management protocols and intelligence sharing, exemplified by the Timber Shield Operation, which coordinates intelligence between Brazilian customs and partner agencies in the United States, Bolivia, and Chile. Throughout 2024, customs personnel seized 69.7 tonnes of illicit drugs and executed over 18,000 anti-smuggling operations, recovering illegal merchandise valued at more than 3.76 billion reais. In addition to narcotics, financial investigations such as the Hidden Carbon Operation in August 2025 and the Hidden Flow Operation in May 2026 uncovered complex money laundering schemes where factions utilized fintechs as parallel banks to move tens of billions of reais.
Constitutional mandates place primary customs control under the Ministry of Finance through the Federal Revenue Service, grounded in Article 237 of the Federal Constitution and reinforced by Article 37, which grants administrative tax authorities precedence in their operational sphere. The Supreme Court established in a 2010 ruling that fiscal inspection activities cannot be obstructed by external administrative hurdles. Tax analysts and union representatives emphasize that customs enforcement functions as an administrative barrier rather than a substitute for judicial police work. To maintain operational integrity, specialists advocate for remote surveillance technologies across land borders, continuous investment in risk analysis infrastructure, a workforce expansion within the tax and customs career track, updated hazard compensation for isolated border posts, and legislative parity with public security forces.
Recent audits by the Federal Court of Accounts reinforced these concerns, identifying inter-agency coordination gaps, inadequate maritime vessel monitoring systems such as VTMIS across most major ports outside Vitória, and weaknesses in port security regulations governed by autonomous decrees rather than federal statute. The tribunal has mandated that relevant agencies draft a joint regulatory framework within 180 days to streamline anti-narcotics efforts. However, union representatives stress that administrative adjustments must be accompanied by structural investments. Currently, the Federal Revenue Service operates with 2,601 inspectors, representing roughly half of the personnel required for adequate fiscal presence. By comparison, neighboring nations maintain larger customs workforces, with Chile employing 1,420, Bolivia 1,597, and Argentina 5,758. Lawmakers in the National Congress now face the legislative responsibility to address staffing levels, career frameworks, and budgetary resources as organized crime continues to exploit structural vulnerabilities in national trade routes.
