A federal judge in Arizona is weighing candidates to lead independent oversight of prison health care—an unusual power test for state officials and a major accountability moment for incarcerated people.
A federal judge’s decision in Arizona has pushed the state’s prison health care system into a new era: independent receivership.
The question now facing U.S.. District Judge Roslyn Silver is less about whether the system needs outside control and more about who should be trusted to exercise it.. The court order places the Arizona Department of Corrections. Rehabilitation and Reentry’s prison health care operations under an independent receiver. covering more than 25. 000 people incarcerated by the state.. After years of litigation and repeated court findings that improvements were not happening fast—or reliably—enough. the selection process has become an operational test of authority. independence. and competence.
For many advocates, the receiver’s job description is not just technical.. It’s political and institutional, too.. Middle Ground Prison Reform’s executive director Donna Hamm said the court should appoint someone willing to stand up to strong opposition and resist outside pressure—whether it comes from the department itself or from elected leadership.. The receiver, Hamm argued, must treat the judge as the ultimate authority, not the governor, the legislature, or correctional leadership.
The filings make clear that competing parties are trying to shape what “receiver power” means in practice.. Attorneys representing the incarcerated submitted a shortlist on April 20, while the department offered a single candidate.. The court has directed both sides to respond to each other’s candidate proposals within a set timeframe. with a further judicial assessment expected afterward.
At the heart of the dispute is scope: who the receiver can reach inside the system. how far oversight extends. and how deeply the receiver can influence staffing. operations. and budgeting.. The plaintiffs’ attorneys argued that the receiver should have access and authority comparable to the director—covering administration. management. operations. staffing. and financing.. They also sought authority over the state’s private health care vendor, NaphCare.. The practical worry behind that argument is simple: without real control over contracted delivery and internal staffing decisions. a receiver can end up watching problems persist instead of fixing them.
The department’s proposal. by contrast. outlines a receivership model that includes participation in the state budgeting process. annual audits. and progress reports every four months.. That approach suggests the receiver’s authority would be structured to align with existing state processes—while still acknowledging that court oversight will be necessary to enforce compliance.
Silver’s selection comes after 14 years of litigation.. In March. the parties submitted proposals not only about who could serve. but also the powers and duties the receiver should be given.. In other words. the court is trying to close a gap that plaintiffs say has existed repeatedly: plans and promises without measurable results.
Among the plaintiffs’ candidates, one name is Kellie Wasko, a corrections health veteran whose career spans public and private roles.. Her background includes more than two decades in correctional health and senior leadership posts across multiple state correctional systems. as well as time as an executive in a private correctional health management company.. Plaintiffs also put forward Leann Bertsch. who led the North Dakota Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation for 15 years and later moved into a private corrections-operations role overseeing contracts across jurisdictions.
The department’s recommended candidate is Annette Chambers-Smith. formerly director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction and currently serving as Ohio’s director of criminal justice under Gov.. Mike DeWine.. The department points to her involvement in resolving a long-running Ohio prison health care lawsuit through a settlement that required reforms affecting staffing. training. medication practices. and mortality reviews.. In her cover letter. Chambers-Smith framed herself as a “trusted agent of the court. ” emphasizing independence. risk identification. and an intent to sustain legal compliance while ensuring care is safe and humane.
Underlying all of this is a question that prison advocates say must be answered quickly: what does “independent” mean when the receiver is operating inside a state system with contractors. budgets. and political incentives?. Hamm said her “measuring stick” for performance will be the volume of complaints reaching her organization from incarcerated people and their families—currently averaging about 20 to 30 complaints per week.. For her, fewer complaints would signal that oversight is producing real-world change, not just paperwork.
In Arizona, the receivership is also happening against a backdrop of legal maneuvering.. The department has indicated it intends to appeal. while agreeing to pause certain proceedings in the Ninth Circuit until Silver issues further orders defining appointing authority and receiver duties.. That pause underscores that the fight over oversight powers may continue even after the candidate is chosen.
Politically, the stakes are bigger than one appointment.. A receiver with too little authority could become a symbol without leverage; a receiver with too much unchecked power could trigger resistance and undermine compliance efforts.. Hamm captured the tension when she warned against appointing someone who would either abuse power or hesitate to use it.
For incarcerated people and their families. though. the power struggle is ultimately about access to functioning care—medical staffing. continuity of treatment. medication oversight. and accountability when the system fails.. In the near term. Silver’s decision on who becomes the receiver and what tools the court will grant will shape not only Arizona’s prison health care delivery. but also how federal courts are willing to operationalize oversight when states cannot deliver reform on their own.