As Washington drives major crises, middle powers find it hard to influence outcomes. Their diplomacy often delivers legitimacy, not leverage.
Efforts by “middle powers” to coordinate and exert greater influence are running into a hard limit: the United States and China set the terms of the international order, and crises are still settled by power.
The idea is familiar in Washington and allied capitals.. In recent months. Misryoum has seen renewed attention on how countries that are neither superpowers nor marginal players can “de-risk” their relationships with great powers by banding together and defending shared norms.. But the hope that collective action can translate into real leverage is colliding with the reality of U.S.. decision-making during major foreign-policy flashpoints.
In Misryoum’s view. the pattern is less about the failure of diplomacy and more about diplomacy’s shrinking room to maneuver.. When major disputes become tests of U.S.. strategy rather than arenas for broad bargaining. middle-power coalitions can end up operating around the agenda of Washington instead of shaping it.
That dynamic showed up starkly in the contrasting ways allied leaders responded to U.S.-Israel actions tied to Iran and broader regional tensions.. Some governments signaled concerns without endorsing a full-throated condemnation, while others treated those actions as illegitimate.. The divergence underlined a recurring problem for middle powers: they may share language about values and de-escalation. but they do not consistently share an adversary. a threat picture. or a common end state for the regional order they claim to want.
Meanwhile. the diplomatic scramble around heightened tensions linked to the Strait of Hormuz illustrates how middle-power formats can multiply without building coherence.. Misryoum notes that “armadillo” style diplomacy. with overlapping groups taking tentative steps. can look active on paper while producing limited strategic effect.. In practice, it can become a patchwork that supplies a multilateral cover for decisions ultimately driven by U.S.. preferences.
The key issue is leverage. Middle powers can help make an outcome more palatable for domestic audiences and easier to justify internationally, but that is not the same as changing the direction of policy when the central security calculation remains with Washington.
The argument extends beyond the Middle East.. Misryoum points to the structural mismatch at the heart of many middle-power narratives: states often join frameworks that presume alignment on how to manage China. yet many of the most prominent “anchor” partners have deep security dependencies and urgent China-related pressures that pull them toward the United States.. Even when governments are motivated to coordinate, their incentives can point in different directions.
Europe’s position reflects a similar constraint.. Countries with major diplomatic voices still operate within alliance frameworks that tie their security planning closely to U.S.. choices.. As a result. efforts aimed at “strategic autonomy” may yield coordination gains and incremental capabilities. but they have not fundamentally altered the ability to steer the most consequential crises away from Washington’s lane.
In the end, Misryoum concludes that credit and influence are being confused.. Middle powers can contribute to the diplomatic choreography and claim partial ownership of the frameworks that emerge after a crisis de-escalates.. But shaping the foundations of the international system depends on power. not only coordination. and for now the foundations continue to be laid by U.S.. strategy in competition with China’s reach.