As MC14 ended in Cameroon with limited breakthroughs, Misryoum examines what WTO multilateralism means for the Global South—rules, fairness, and the risk when major powers sidestep them.
YAOUNDÉ, Cameroon — The 14th Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organisation, held in Yaoundé from March 26 to 29, left ministers with a familiar dilemma: how to reform a system many still rely on, without a clear, shared roadmap.
At the heart of the debate is trade multilateralism—an approach where global rules, not unilateral pressure, shape market access and commercial expectations.. Misryoum asked what the principles of WTO-based multilateral trading really mean, especially for countries in the Global South that need predictability as they scale exports.
Trade multilateralism, according to Pradeep S.. Mehta, frames international trade as a rules-based public good.. He describes the WTO as the “plumbing system” of global trade, arguing that its basic pillars—non-discrimination, transparency, and fair competition—help reduce volatility.. For businesses, the value is practical: stable rules can support longer-term investment decisions, including the ability to manufacture and then sell goods and services into distant markets.
For developing and least-developed countries, this structure also acts as a brake on power imbalances.. The concern, Mehta says, is that without multilateral disciplines, major economies could more easily dictate terms on smaller trading partners.. In his view, multilateralism gives smaller powers a voice in shaping the system rather than simply absorbing decisions made elsewhere.
The conference unfolded against a backdrop of heightened pressure on WTO rules.. Mehta points to the erosion of the system through U.S.. tariff policy since early 2025, describing it as a disregard for commitments under the WTO framework.. His argument is not just legal; it is strategic—when a major power moves outside agreed obligations, the credibility of the entire rulebook weakens.
That credibility question extends to how different developing blocs view the WTO today.. Misryoum notes that there is no single “Global South” position at the WTO, but coalitions representing developing and least-developed members continue to support the system’s core idea.. Mehta cites groupings such as the G-90, which include African, Caribbean and Pacific states along with the African Group and the LDC Group, as examples of countries that still place faith in WTO rules.
Still, frustrations are growing, particularly where negotiating progress affects daily economic realities.. Mehta highlights areas that matter to many Global South members: dispute settlement reform, agricultural negotiations, meaningful market access for merchandise and services exports, and progress on certain plurilateral efforts such as investment facilitation and e-commerce.
When it comes to major developing powers, positions are not always aligned.. Mehta says India and China may converge on systemic issues like the need for a functioning dispute settlement mechanism, but they diverge on other foundational questions.. One example is special and differential treatment (S&DT).. He notes that China decided to voluntarily forgo future benefits under S&DT, while India continues to defend the principle and resists changes related to how development status is declared within the WTO.
The lack of coordination is important because reform efforts often require coalitions.. Even when countries agree on strengthening the rules-based system in principle, differences on specific issues—such as consensus-based decision-making or substantive areas like agriculture and industrial subsidies—can slow agreement.. In practice, this means the WTO can appear simultaneously essential and difficult to move.
The MC14 outcome, Mehta says, was marked more by indecision than by breakthroughs.. He characterises the ministerial as “uneventful,” noting disappointment in the absence of movement on a structured negotiating agenda for WTO reform and the lack of a meaningful declaration with a concrete pathway forward.. Yet, he also points to less-publicised developments worth attention.
One positive item, he says, is the renewal of the third phase of the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) until 2031.. The EIF is designed to support trade-driven development in least-developed countries, including diagnostic work and capacity building around standards in agriculture.. Similar support tools, he adds, remind the world that trade is not an end goal by itself; it can be a vehicle for employment and broader economic development—if countries can meet requirements and access markets.
Looking ahead, the question many members are quietly asking is what happens if the WTO functions without the full cooperation of the United States.. Mehta warns that U.S.. actions and messaging after MC14 signal scepticism about the WTO’s value, even as some mixed signals appeared, such as payments of outstanding dues and renewed personnel in Geneva.
He argues that even if technical participation continues, the deeper risk is policy direction: submissions on WTO reform may still aim to erode non-discrimination and weaken the system’s core promise.. For the Global South, this is not an abstract debate.. It can translate into harder negotiations, less predictable access, and greater asymmetry when deals are reshaped outside multilateral safeguards.
For African least-developed countries, the impacts are already visible, Mehta says, in the context of U.S.. unilateral tariff measures that have adversely affected exports.. He adds that even policy extensions such as the retrospective extension of AGOA through the end of the year do not fully undo that damage.. In his view, substitutes for WTO certainty are hard to find, and bilateral bargaining outside the rules can make outcomes less reliable.
The core takeaway from MC14 may be uncomfortable: trade multilateralism remains the best available framework for smaller economies to secure predictable conditions, but the system’s momentum depends on whether major powers respect the rules they helped build.. If not, the cost will likely fall on countries that can least afford uncertainty—especially LDCs trying to convert trade into development.