cheap replaceable – A Ukrainian robot maker argues long wars strain expensive armored fleets, while cheaper, replaceable ground robots can fill key roles and keep logistics moving.
Ukraine’s war experience is turning into a painful lesson for defense planners: in a long conflict, “how many you can replace” can matter as much as “how strong you are.”
That’s the core argument now coming from a Ukrainian ground-robot maker, DevDroid.. Its research-and-development director. Oleg Fedoryshyn. says Western militaries looking at years-long wars should weigh warfighting robots not just as high-tech experiments. but as scalable. lower-cost systems that can be produced and replaced faster than tanks and other heavily armored vehicles.
The money problem behind the hardware
Fedoryshyn’s point is fundamentally economic, not just tactical.. Major conflicts can deplete fleets of tanks and armored vehicles quickly—not only because they are used in front-line fighting. but also because they’re often pulled into tasks that span combat support and logistics.. In that kind of environment. relying on expensive platforms can become unsustainable: when losses mount. the timeline and cost of replacement can lag behind battlefield attrition.
Robots, he argues, change the math.. They are not presented as perfect substitutes for tanks—more on that in a moment—but as “quite cheap” systems that are easier to produce and replace if destroyed.. In a protracted campaign where drones. artillery. and other battlefield threats drive constant losses. the ability to replenish equipment at scale becomes a strategic advantage.
Why cheaper, expendable systems fit the modern battlefield
This logic aligns with broader warnings from Western defense officials that prolonged wars against near-peer rivals could strain stockpiles of precision munitions and other high-demand categories.. The same pressure can spill over into vehicle inventories, especially as inexpensive drone strikes proliferate.
Ukraine has become an unusually visible case study.. Many of its low-cost drones do not always hit their targets or deliver decisive effects on every attempt.. Yet they are deployed at such scale that their overall impact can still be costly for more expensive assets.. The underlying principle is attrition-friendly warfare: accept losses where they’re fast and cheap enough to tolerate. while targeting systems that are expensive to field and harder to replace.
That approach is now being extended beyond drones to ground robotics.. Ukraine already uses ground robots for evacuation of injured soldiers. carrying weapons and heavy goods. laying and removing mines. and conducting attacks using mounted payloads.. These are treated as expendable tools—designed to keep operations moving even when battlefield conditions force systems to be lost.
Robots won’t replace tanks—but they may replace roles that tanks can’t afford to lose
There’s a reason the conversation keeps coming back to “roles,” not a full replacement. Ground robots are generally less capable than tanks in key areas such as crossing difficult terrain, offering heavy protection for valuable assets, and delivering larger, higher-impact attacks.
Still, even partial role shifts can matter in a long war.. Fedoryshyn’s framing suggests that the value of ground robots may be greatest where humans and expensive platforms are most vulnerable: pushing logistics forward under threat. supporting localized attacks. or handling dangerous tasks that don’t require full tank-level protection.. If a robot can deliver explosives to a position. or carry equipment to the front lines. the tank fleet can be reserved for missions where its advantages are most irreplaceable.
That “keep humans safer” angle is particularly important when attrition is expected. Replace a portion of high-risk logistics and support with machines, and you reduce the frequency with which high-value platforms and personnel must enter the same danger zones.
Ukraine’s bet on scaling: from pilot projects to procurement numbers
Ukraine’s robot plans also reflect an industrial ramp-up mindset. Defense leadership has pointed to a push for systems that are both cheap and effective, with the ability to scale quickly. The strategy has moved from sporadic deployments toward larger procurement targets.
Fedoryshyn says his company can update and repair robots quickly. including by keeping teams near the front lines for fast fixes or upgrades.. That operational capability—same-day repairs and battlefield recovery—adds a second layer to the cost argument: it isn’t just about buying robots. it’s about minimizing downtime and increasing the odds that damaged units return to service.
From a business perspective, this is where defense modernization starts to look like manufacturing economics. Success depends on throughput, spare parts, maintenance cycles, and rapid iteration—factors that determine whether a fleet can remain viable after repeated damage.
The macro lesson for Western militaries: affordability is readiness
Ukraine’s experience is already reshaping debates about what “readiness” should mean.. In a scenario where battlefield attrition is steady and high. readiness cannot rely solely on expensive platforms that are slow to replace.. Even militaries with strong industrial bases face real constraints when losses are frequent and war demand accelerates production needs across multiple categories at once.
Ground robots, in this view, become a tool to spread risk. They can absorb part of the cost of doing business in combat—especially in logistics and support tasks—while keeping tanks and armored vehicles for the moments when they deliver unique battlefield advantages.
Looking ahead, the central question for buyers is whether robot programs can scale like supply chains, not like one-off prototypes.. If costs stay low. repairs stay fast. and performance stays “good enough” for defined missions. then the long-war logic becomes straightforward: cheap machines that can be replenished may deliver more total combat power than a smaller number of highly protected vehicles.
In a war defined by persistent threats and rapid losses, the winners may not be the systems that look most powerful on paper. They may be the systems that keep showing up—again and again—because they are designed to survive the economics of attrition.