German foreign – A new book and fresh assessments examine Germany’s foreign-policy shift, weighing rhetorical missteps against tougher defense decisions.
Germany’s foreign policy has often been judged by how convincingly it can explain its choices—and by whether those choices match the world around it.. A journalist’s recollection from 2000. told through reflections that arrive decades later. puts that credibility problem into stark personal terms and also frames a broader question now being debated in Berlin: whether Germany can live up to a leadership role when international crises multiply.
Jörg Lau. writing a quarter of a century after a summer evening barbecue in North Dakota. recounts meeting a farming family hosting him.. The host. John Wald. said his son was about to be sent to Kosovo as part of a United Nations peacekeeping force.. Lau describes a conversation in which Wald asked—gently but directly—why his “sons” had to be sent so far away. expressing skepticism about the logic of deploying soldiers for Europe’s peace.. Lau recalls struggling to provide a plausible explanation. and admitting that he had not only failed to convince Wald. but also could not fully convince himself.
Lau’s reflections are drawn from his work as a foreign affairs specialist and journalist. distilled in a new book titled Der Westen sind jetzt wir (“The West. That’s Us Now”).. He divides his critique into four thematic areas: the United States, Russia, the Middle East, and China.. Across those regions, he argues that German policymaking has fallen short for decades.. Yet the book is not presented as purely condemnatory; Lau ends with recommendations for a Germany that is more courageous and more self-confident. and that can help shape a more autonomous Europe able to cope with what he describes as a worsening international order involving U.S.. President Donald Trump, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Whether Germany’s government can deliver on that kind of shift is now being tested under Chancellor Friedrich Merz. whose first anniversary is described as arriving in early May.. When Merz took office. the account says. Europe was still absorbing early attacks on liberal democracy attributed to the Trump administration. and Merz signaled a more robust German response toward Washington. Moscow. and Beijing—declaring that Germany “is back.”
Since then. the narrative describes a sequence of developments that raise pressure on German choices and communications. including June 2025 U.S.. attacks on Iran. an operation in Venezuela. threats involving Canada and Greenland. and a later escalation tied to a U.S.-Israeli war on Iran that the text says began on Feb.. 28.. In response. the assessment says Germany’s posture depends on whether one views the record as more promising or more troubling.. One focus is the pattern of rhetorical inconsistency attributed to Merz: before a trip to Washington. he is said to have stated he would not “lecture” the White House on international law. while also dismissing the role of values—language that echoes a broader preference for “deals” and “interests.”
The text also describes episodes in which Merz’s approach appears to have aligned too closely with U.S.. framing.. It says he praised the United States for taking on the West’s “dirty work” connected to eliminating former leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and for degrading Iran’s nuclear potential.. While sitting beside Trump in the Oval Office. the account describes Merz as smiling when Trump criticized Spanish and British prime ministers. Pedro Sanchez and Keir Starmer. for not aiding the war effort.. After returning to Germany. however. the narrative says Merz moved away from Trump. in what the piece characterizes as an abrupt change after reassessing consequences for Germany and Europe’s economies—alongside a note that rising oil prices were benefiting Putin.
On China. the article portrays Merz as presenting himself as a hawk while traveling with business delegations and speaking about partnership.. It also suggests that Germany. like other European governments. faces a recurring challenge in managing the trade-versus-security dilemma when the U.S.. eventually engages more directly with Beijing.. The piece then points to what it calls “clangors” in other areas. including Merz’s travel to Belém. Brazil. to attend the opening of the U.N.. Climate Change Conference in November, followed by remarks after his return that disparaged the host city.. The cited quote in the account has Merz asking journalists who were with him in Brazil whether anyone would want to stay there—describing that no one raised a hand and that everyone was glad to be back in Germany.
Still, the article argues that Merz’s longer-term direction deserves greater credit than the short-term missteps.. It says he has overhauled Germany’s approach to military spending in under a year. pushing through a constitutional change that allows heavy borrowing for defense.. The account also describes a push for public debate on expanding the capabilities of Germany’s armed forces into what it calls Europe’s most powerful—and quickly.. In parallel, the text credits Merz with recognizing the possibility of long-term U.S.. disengagement from Europe. along with near-term unpredictability. and raises the possibility of European Union defense guarantees and even the extension of the French nuclear umbrella.. It also says Merz has supported sustained action for Ukraine and has “gotten many of the big calls right. ” while emphasizing that detailed disagreement continues in Berlin.
One area where the article says debate remains blocked is policy toward Israel.. Lau’s position. as described here. is for a nuanced public discussion that separates the fight against antisemitism at home from protecting Israel as a state. while also encouraging a move away from what the piece calls slavish support for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—particularly regarding what it describes as expansionist ambitions and extremist ministers.. The narrative adds that many politicians acknowledge similar points, but only within private discourse.
The conclusion returns to the question of readiness for hard power and leadership.. It recounts Lau’s final conversation over beer with a Finnish colleague about how Finland might react if the United States withdrew from NATO.. The colleague is said to have replied that Finland already assumed the U.S.. would not remain for them. and that Nordic and Baltic states together with Poland would be enough to hold back Russia.. The piece concludes that Germany is heading in that direction but. militarily and psychologically. still has further ground to cover—turning the debate about policy into a test of adaptation and national confidence.