Misryoum reports a royal commission found counterterrorism’s share of intelligence funding fell from 2020–2025, even as overall budgets rose—raising questions ahead of Bondi-related hearings.
Australia’s intelligence agencies have shifted spending priorities since 2020, and a royal commission’s first findings suggest counterterrorism has paid the price.
The key point for readers is simple: total funding to the national intelligence community has grown, but the slice directed to counterterrorism has declined noticeably.. Misryoum, drawing on the commission’s interim report, says the review examined classified material connected to failings that may have contributed to last year’s Bondi terror attack.
The commission found that from 2020 to 2025, the “proportion of funding” allocated to counterterrorism “significantly declined” across the national intelligence community.. That conclusion sits alongside a wider budget picture that is more encouraging at first glance.. Overall intelligence agency funding rose from $10.9 billion five years ago to $14.3 billion—an increase of 31 per cent—meaning the issue was not money running out, but how money was allocated.
Misryoum understands the report’s tension is amplified by agency priorities described internally in recent years.. The commission referenced statements from the head of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) that its focus moved from terrorism toward foreign espionage and interference as a primary concern, before the national terrorism threat level was raised to “probable” in 2024 and counterterrorism again became central.
This matters because counterterrorism is not just a spending line—it is the operating rhythm of prevention.. When resources flow more heavily toward other threats, the day-to-day work of investigators, analysts, and joint teams can change accordingly.. Even if terrorism remains a priority in principle, the practical consequences can show up later: in how quickly warnings are processed, in how robust information handling systems are, and in how thoroughly agencies test early leads.
The commission also scrutinised whether counterterrorism planning kept pace with that changing threat environment.. It flagged that Australia’s national counterterrorism plan and accompanying handbook had not been updated “substantively” since 2019.. The plan is supposed to be reviewed every three years by a committee with representation from state and territory leaders, but the report notes there has been no review since 2020, aside from “minor” changes in 2021.
A further complication identified by the commission relates to the committee’s leadership structure.. The counterterror coordinator’s role, once a standalone job within Home Affairs, has expanded over time—now also covering citizenship, social cohesion, national security, and acting as head of the counter-foreign interference coordinator role, in addition to leading national security work.. Misryoum reports that committee members agreed, after the Bondi attack, to undertake a fresh review expected to be completed by May, and the commissioner urged it to be finished promptly and then reviewed at least every three years.
On the political front, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese avoided questions about whether counterterrorism resourcing was insufficient, pointing instead to the overall funding increase for national security agencies.. He also indicated that the report includes a “clear table” showing money had risen across the board.
But Misryoum notes the commission’s interim findings stop short of deciding whether intelligence prior to the Bondi attack failed in a direct, definitive way.. The report says it will examine deeper issues in later hearings, in part to ensure procedural fairness for any person or agency that might face an adverse finding.
Still, the interim report stresses something that sounds reassuring on its face: it says it found no urgent changes are required to keep Australians safe, and that legal and regulatory frameworks did not hinder agencies from taking “prohibitive actions” on or before December 14.. That, however, does not answer the other question many Australians are likely to be asking—whether the system was optimally arranged to detect, share, and act on warning signs.
The commission also raised concerns about information management and sharing within joint counterterrorism teams, much of which was kept confidential.. Misryoum reports that the commissioner noted the Australian Federal Police and NSW Police had not provided “unqualified support” for the current functioning of NSW’s joint counterterrorism team.. The report points to possible room for improvement, particularly on the flow of information between agencies and the quality of their cooperation.
One example specifically mentioned is the Dural caravan bomb hoax discovered by NSW Police in early 2025—later described by the AFP on March 10 as a “fabricated terrorism plot” and a “criminal con job.” While the report does not detail what the weaknesses were, it frames the issue as one of system resilience: joint teams saved lives, but they need to work effectively as threats evolve.
Finally, Misryoum notes the interim report recommends a comprehensive review of information sharing and the strength of relationships among agencies, with the task to be delivered to police commissioners and the director-general of security within three months of the review beginning.. Home Affairs Minister Tony Burke said the government is ready to undertake it, and Albanese accepted the interim recommendations that relate to the federal government—though five of the 14 recommendations remain secret.