A royal commission reveals a significant decline in counterterrorism funding despite overall budget hikes, prompting urgent questions about national security.
Intelligence agencies have significantly shifted spending away from counterterrorism since 2020, a royal commission has identified, in the first findings of what failings led to last year’s Bondi terror attack.
Funding to intelligence agencies overall has risen from $10.9 billion five years ago to $14.3 billion, a 31 per cent lift.. However, the Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion’s examination of classified information found the share of that money dedicated to counterterrorism has fallen sharply over that time.. “Upon review of classified material, the commission has observed that despite this overall increase, the proportion of funding allocated to counterterrorism significantly declined across the national intelligence community over the period from 2020 to 2025,” royal commissioner Virginia Bell noted.. This revelation comes as the nation grapples with a security environment that has become increasingly volatile, forcing officials to reassess whether the shift in focus—away from terror toward foreign interference—was a strategic miscalculation.
The Royal Commission’s findings suggest a complex disconnect between high-level policy pivots and operational reality.. While intelligence leaders like ASIO’s Mike Burgess correctly identified foreign espionage as a primary threat, the report implies that the pendulum may have swung too far, leaving a vacuum in traditional counterterrorism capabilities.. This transition back to a “probable” terror threat level suggests that the security apparatus is now racing to reconcile its budget allocations with a landscape that refuses to stay static.. When the quiet offices of Canberra shift funding priorities, the ripple effects are felt on the front lines, where joint counterterrorism teams struggle with information silos and outdated frameworks that have barely kept pace with modern threats.
Outdated Plans and Administrative Hurdles
As part of its investigation into resource management, the commission identified that Australia’s national counterterrorism plan and accompanying handbook had not been “substantively” updated since 2019.. The plan is intended to be a living document, reviewed every three years by state and territory leaders to ensure agencies are prepared for evolving threats.. Instead, it has remained largely static, with only minor tweaks performed in 2021..
Administrative bloat within the Home Affairs Department further complicates these issues.. Since 2019, the role of the counterterror coordinator has been expanded to include social cohesion, citizenship, and foreign interference oversight.. This multitasking approach risks diluting the focus necessary for high-stakes security operations.. By spreading the responsibility too thin, the government inadvertently created a bottleneck where specialized expertise is subordinated to broader bureaucratic demands.
Information Sharing and Operational Friction
Beyond funding, the commission flagged concerns regarding the functionality of joint counterterrorism teams.. While these units have saved lives in the past, internal feedback suggests significant friction, particularly regarding information management.. The investigation into the Dural caravan bomb hoax underscored these weaknesses, pointing toward a need for better integration between the Australian Federal Police and state-level counterparts.. Improving the ‘flow’ of intelligence is not just a technical requirement; it is a fundamental necessity for ensuring that preemptive strikes against radicalized individuals are not lost in a maze of departmental red tape.
Ultimately, the commission’s report serves as a somber reminder that in the world of national security, inertia is an enemy.. As Misryoum observes, the current push to modernize these systems must move past bureaucratic review cycles and into tangible operational reform.. If the government’s legal frameworks are sound, as the Prime Minister maintains, then the failure likely lies in the human and systemic architecture that connects the various branches of the intelligence community.. The upcoming three-month review will be the true test of whether authorities can foster the genuine cooperation required to secure the streets against a fluid and unpredictable threat.