Across the Asia-Pacific region, governments and businesses reeling from the energy shock of the United States and Israel’s war on Iran are closely watching the US midterm elections. Many leaders and market participants hope for enormous changes during the remainder of President Donald Trump’s term, spanning everything from the ongoing conflict in the Middle East to trade and tariff policies. However, analysts suggest that major shifts are unlikely, even if Democrats capture the House of Representatives and potentially the Senate from the Republican Party.
“Of course, everybody is watching,” said Steven Okun, a trade specialist and chief executive of Singapore-based consulting firm APAC Advisors. “It’s great political theatre.”
Outside the Middle East, the Asia-Pacific has absorbed severe economic blows from the war on Iran. Prior to the outbreak of conflict in January, the region imported the majority of the Gulf oil and gas passing through the Strait of Hormuz. When Iran closed that vital chokepoint following US and Israel strikes, wide swaths of the region faced acute shortages.
The Philippines, dependent on the Gulf for more than 90 percent of its crude oil imports, has operated under a national energy emergency since March. Surging fuel costs have drained foreign exchange reserves among the region’s poorest economies, including Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and East Timor, according to the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore. Meanwhile, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam have deployed heavy spending on fuel subsidies to protect consumers.
Public opinion across the Asia-Pacific remains firmly opposed to the war, but Okun noted that a Democratic-controlled Congress would likely lack the leverage to force President Trump to end the eight-month conflict.
“With Iran, I don’t see them having much change at all, other than the fact that the war will be investigated and there will be oversight hearings,” Okun said. “We might even see an impeachment of the secretary of defence, but it doesn’t change the overall impact of the war.”
While the US Constitution grants Congress the power to formally declare war, Trump has defended the military actions as measures of self-defence and bypassed congressional resolutions demanding the withdrawal of US forces. Should a Democratic-controlled Congress pass legislation restricting or defunding military operations, Trump retains veto power. Overriding a presidential veto requires a two-thirds majority in both legislative chambers, a threshold Democrats are widely expected to miss.
On the fronts of trade and tariffs, analysts similarly project little legislative intervention to curb executive authority. Trump previously shook global markets by imposing reciprocal tariffs ranging from 10 percent to 50 percent on roughly 90 countries to reduce the US trade deficit, hitting Asian economies particularly hard. Cambodia faced a 49 percent tariff, Laos 48 percent, Vietnam 46 percent, and Myanmar 45 percent.
After the Supreme Court struck down those specific tariffs in February, the administration shifted tactics. In July, it levied tariffs of 10 percent and 12.5 percent on goods from 60 trading partners, citing failures to stop imports made with forced labour. That roster includes China, Japan, South Korea, and seven Southeast Asian nations: Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
“In some ways, the new Congress is not going to matter to the Asia Pacific because it’s not going to affect trade policy,” Okun said. “Congress cannot change that … Tariffs don’t change. The war doesn’t change.”
Nevertheless, certain analysts identify a narrow opening. Stephen Olson, a visiting fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, argued in a recent essay that a strong voter rebuke of political trends could embolden a pro-free-trade faction within the Republican Party that has remained quiet during the Trump presidency. Olson wrote that this dynamic offers a glimmer of hope for Southeast Asian exporters dependent on the US market, suggesting a Democratic-controlled Congress might advocate for carve-outs and exceptions to grant regional exporters some relief. Deeper structural shifts in trade policy, however, are widely expected to wait until the 2028 presidential election.
Joshua Kurlantzick, a senior fellow for Southeast Asia and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations, observed that the region’s priorities extend beyond trade to fundamental security.
“I think nearly all of Asia would like to see enormous changes, across many domains, during the rest of Trump’s term,” Kurlantzick said. “But I think much of the region believes this will not happen.”
Beyond trade and tariff stability, Asia-Pacific nations seek dependable security guarantees from Washington alongside a clearer, more visible naval and diplomatic presence in the South China Sea—where competing territorial claims involve China and five Southeast Asian nations—and in the Taiwan Strait.
Businesses will also monitor whether significant Republican losses foster greater willingness among congressional Republicans to unite with Democrats on key economic issues, including trade policy, tariffs, arms sales, and overall unpredictability.
One domain where analysts anticipate tangible legislative movement is US policy regarding Chinese technology. Regardless of which party holds congressional majorities, experts predict the passage of stricter curbs on China. Proposed measures include the Remote Access Security Act, which would extend export controls to the remote access of US goods, software, and technology; the Chip Security Act, mandating verification that advanced artificial intelligence chips remain in authorized locations; and the Multilateral Alignment of Technology Controls on Hardware Act, known as the MATCH Act, which pressures international allies to align chipmaking equipment controls with Washington to restrict China’s access to advanced manufacturing technology.
“The next Congress is going to pass them regardless of midterms because both parties agree on them,” Okun said, adding that President Trump currently represents the less restrictive figure on China due to his diplomatic engagement with Chinese President Xi Jinping. The two leaders have met twice this year amid a warming of diplomatic ties following a costly trade war, and Trump has temporarily withheld approval of a $14bn arms sale package to Taiwan to preserve a fragile trade truce.
At the same time, some observers express concern that a politically hemmed-in, lame-duck US president might pivot more aggressively toward unpredictable foreign policy moves.
“We should not be surprised by continued erratic foreign policy,” said James Guild, an assistant professor at the Indonesian International Islamic University. “The Democrats have a poor record of effectively opposing and holding Trump accountable using conventional tools of congressional oversight. We will have to wait and see if they rise to the moment this time.”
