After eight months of a punishing conflict that has decimated its leadership and impoverished the country, Iran is facing mounting pressure from within and without over the future of its atomic program. While much of the nation’s nuclear infrastructure lies in ruins from U.S. and Israeli airstrikes, Tehran continues to hold nearly 1,000 pounds of highly enriched uranium—material sitting just one step away from weapons-grade fuel.
That lingering stockpile, combined with recent hardline diplomatic statements, has led foreign policy experts in Washington to conclude that Iran is now more likely than before the war to pursue a nuclear weapon as a ultimate deterrent. Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, recently made clear during peace discussions that not a single gram of enriched uranium will be removed from the country, signaling that Tehran views its remaining nuclear assets as crucial leverage.
Rosemary Kelanic, director of the Middle East program at Defense Priorities, argues that the war has fundamentally altered calculations in Tehran. There is little question, she notes, that Iranian leaders have concluded conventional deterrence failed against the United States, making the bomb look like their only viable path for preservation.
Others point out that the experience of a conflict explicitly aimed at regime change has hardened official positions in Tehran. James Acton, co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, notes that while the war may not have achieved all its objectives, the elimination of top leadership figures has left a lasting impression on the Iranian establishment.
This hardening stance comes amid a backdrop of volatile diplomacy and renewed military threats. Vice President JD Vance recently sent a letter to General Rezaei via Qatari diplomats proposing an immediate resumption of comprehensive peace negotiations led by Washington, insisting that Iran’s nuclear program be included from the outset. At the same time, President Donald Trump has fanned speculation about renewed airstrikes, warning Persian Gulf leaders to prepare for possible escalation following the U.S. midterm elections.
Sina Azodi, director of the Middle East Studies Program at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, suggests that military force alone will not resolve the challenge. While airstrikes may buy time, repeated military action reinforces the internal argument within Iran that only nuclear weapons provide lasting security.
Dr. Azodi outlines three potential paths for Tehran: dismantlement, weaponization, or rebuilding to the weapon-threshold level that existed before the 12-day air campaign in June 2025. He considers dismantlement the least likely route, noting that Iranian leadership observed the fate of Muammar Qaddafi in Libya and concluded that giving up a nuclear program triggers an inevitable slippery slope toward unconditional surrender and regime collapse.
Conversely, regional examples like North Korea reinforce the opposite lesson. Dr. Acton observes that Pyongyang’s survival under the Kim family demonstrates to global leaders that possessing a nuclear deterrent is an effective safeguard for regime preservation.
Furthermore, Dr. Kelanic identifies multiple ways the recent conflict dismantled internal opposition to a nuclear breakout. The war eliminated moderate leaders who historically opposed going nuclear, as well as Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who had previously issued a fatwa banning atomic weapons development. Compounding these hurdles is a profound lack of trust in Washington, stemming from previous withdrawals from international agreements like the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Experts agree that achieving the trust necessary for comprehensive international oversight and inspections will remain a formidable diplomatic barrier.
