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Why China is resisting a trilateral nuclear arms treaty with the US and Russia

The world’s leading nuclear-armed powers are slated to hold their first-ever trilateral meeting as United States President Donald Trump presses for a new nuclear arms treaty involving Washington, Beijing, and Moscow. Trump is scheduled to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin for talks on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shenzhen, China, according to White House confirmation.

Top of the agenda for Washington and Moscow is the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which lapsed in February and ended more than half a century of limits on US and Russian strategic nuclear weapons. Trump previously rejected Russia’s proposal to extend the treaty, demanding instead a new, modernised deal that includes Beijing. However, China has long signalled its unwillingness to join any nuclear arms control treaty.

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New START was signed in 2010 by then-US President Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev, serving as president of Russia from 2008 to 2012, and was extended in 2021 for five years under US President Joe Biden. The accord permitted Russia and the US to deploy no more than 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads and a maximum of 700 long-range missiles and bombers, limited intercontinental ballistic missiles to 800 in deployment, and granted up to 18 annual inspections of strategic nuclear weapons sites per party. The five-year extension expired in February, collapsing the accord. It built upon earlier pacts including START I, signed in 1991 between the US and the Soviet Union; START II, signed in 1993 but never entering into force before Russia formally withdrew in 2002; and the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) from 2003 to 2011, which had less monitoring. The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 previously ended on-site inspections, leaving both nations reliant on intelligence to judge compliance. Together, the two nations possess about 86 percent of all nuclear warheads.

Trump has long sought China’s inclusion because Washington believes a bilateral treaty is no longer appropriate. “Today, the United States faces threats from multiple nuclear powers. In short, a bilateral treaty with only one nuclear power is simply inappropriate in 2026 and going forward,” US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control Thomas DiNanno said in February. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that same month that Trump made it clear that a true 21st-century arms control framework must include China due to its vast and rapidly growing stockpile. Washington also wants a successor treaty to address weapons not covered by New START, with DiNanno noting it must account for all Russian nuclear weapons, both novel and existing, and address the breakout growth of Chinese nuclear stockpiles.

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China’s reluctance is largely driven by the sheer disparity in warheads. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China possesses an estimated 620 warheads, well below the 800 cap each for Russia and the US under New START. Moscow and Washington now hold more than 5,000 each, according to SIPRI data, with the US having retired a third of its nuclear warheads and Russia less than a fourth. At the same time, China’s arsenal is growing faster than any country’s, adding about 100 new warheads annually since 2023.

When New START expired in February, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Lin Jian explained Beijing’s opposition in a statement, noting that China’s forces are not on the same level as those of the US and Russia, and that China will not participate in disarmament negotiations at this stage. Zhao Minghao, a professor at the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, noted that this structural asymmetry, alongside domestic restraints, explains the resistance. “China maintains a declared no-first-use policy and a ‘minimum deterrence’ posture – nuclear weapons as political instruments for assured retaliation, not warfighting,” Zhao said, adding that Beijing views its arsenal as already restrained by doctrine, while a trilateral treaty would cap its insurance and impose intrusive verification on a comparatively small force. Zhao also cited a credibility problem given past US withdrawals from treaties such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, stating Beijing’s strategic logic is that nuclear inferiority invites coercion.

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Sun Chenghao, a fellow at the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University, noted that Chinese assessments also factor in US missile defences, precision-strike capabilities, and emerging technologies that could weaken its retaliatory capability. William Yang, senior analyst for Northeast Asia at the International Crisis Group, added that there is no clear advantage for Beijing, which views any treaty as a mechanism designed to limit its nuclear modernisation and prefers to maintain strategic autonomy. Meanwhile, Alejandro Reyes, an Asia Pacific policy specialist and professor at the University of Hong Kong, observed that China’s rapid nuclear expansion raises legitimate questions about its ultimate intentions given its lack of transparency, noting that observers should neither assume Beijing seeks parity nor assume its declared commitment to minimum deterrence fully explains its current build-up.

According to analysts, China would only engage in a trilateral framework if the US and Russia first reduce their arsenals toward genuine parity. Zhao argued the path could be incremental, beginning with a sustained US-China strategic stability dialogue featuring concrete reciprocity such as test moratoria, data exchanges, and notification of major exercises. Sun suggested negotiations must also address missile defence, advanced conventional weapons, and emerging technologies, proposing differentiated obligations, phased verification, and three-way discussions on crisis communication, nuclear doctrines, and human control over AI-enabled nuclear systems. Reyes emphasised that an agreement must accommodate different levels of capability rather than insist on identical ceilings. “The fundamental obstacle is political trust,” Reyes said. “Each side regards its own nuclear capabilities as defensive while viewing the others’ modernisation programmes as potentially threatening. That dynamic encourages an arms race even when no side necessarily wants one.” Zhao added that the likeliest near-term outcome is not a treaty, but informal restraints while formal arms control waits for a geopolitical thaw that the current decade is unlikely to deliver.

Sophia Mitchell

Sophia Mitchell reports on international affairs, global developments, and major events across regions. She brings readers reliable updates and useful context on the people, decisions, and challenges shaping an interconnected world.
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